大家论坛

 找回密码
 注册
查看: 777|回复: 1

[经济学人] [2007.08.16]Risk and the new financial order: surviving the markets

[复制链接]

165

主题

8154

帖子

3万

金币

大家网博士后

Rank: 22Rank: 22Rank: 22Rank: 22

积分
20162
发表于 2010-4-28 21:34 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Risk and the new financial order
风险与新金融秩序


Surviving the markets
接受市场考验
Aug 16th 2007
From The Economist print edition


The new financial order is undergoing its harshest test. It will not be pretty, but it is necessary
新金融秩序面临大考,这场考验不容乐观,但却十分必要。



lifeguards had been scanning the horizon for an oil-price shock, a bankrupt buy-out or a terrorist attack. But when the big wave struck last week it surprised them by coming from inside the financial system and threatening to swamp an unlikely shore, the money markets where banks lend to each other to help cover their daily operations. Investors have been asking for years if the frantic innovation in finance, especially the securitisation of just about every form of debt into a tradable asset, was a way to spread risk efficiently, or whether this left the financial system prone to rare—but cataclysmic—failures. It looks as if investors are about to find out.
长久以来,救生员都在时刻扫视地平线,警惕灾祸发生:石油价格上涨,破产企业拍卖或是恐怖袭击。然而上周,一时间风浪大作,救生员乱了阵脚:金融系统内部混乱,惊涛骇浪仿佛要淹没一片看似十分安全的海岸 —— 银行间互相借账以敷日常运营的货币市场。许多年来,投资者都面临着这样一个问题:如果人们疯狂创新金融系统  —— 尤其是推行资产证券化,即将信贷资产转化为可交易的证券 —— 会不会使得风险迅速扩散,或是让金融系统更容易遭到破坏。这些破坏出现的机率不大,但一旦出现,后果不堪设想。现在,投资者似乎就快找到答案了。

Over the past week central banks have lent tens of billions of dollars to restore confidence to the markets (see article). But it is already clear that this mess is about more than a bit of rash mortgage lending to Americans who were in the habit of falling behind with their monthly payments. Hedge funds and private-equity firms, kings of the boom, are nursing big losses. Debt markets that once handed out cash to all comers are tight or closed altogether. In almost every asset market, investors are scurrying to reprice risk—which mostly means to reduce it.
上周,各国中央银行放贷数百亿美元,重塑市场信用(参见相关报道)。之前有人认为,上周的混乱是一小部分不负责任的抵押贷款造成的, 这些借贷人总是不按时交纳当月付款数,已经习以为常。现在人们已经明白,问题不是这么简单。那些套利基金和私募公司,在景气时独占鳌头,现在却蒙受巨大损失。各种债务市场曾经大把投资,无孔不入,现在纷纷紧缩,一起关门。几乎每个资产市场里的投资者都急不可待,忙着重估风险,目的大多都是降低风险。

The gravest and most immediate threat is to the banking system. For the time being, banks no longer trust other banks enough to lend them money except on onerous terms; equally worryingly, they lack confidence that other banks will trust them if they want to borrow. It is alarming when the very outfits that exist to supply the economy with credit start to hoard it from each other. At best this tightens monetary policy; at worst, a shortage of cash will cripple the payments system and cause runs on otherwise solvent banks and businesses that cannot rapidly raise funds.
金融系统遭受的威胁是最严重,最直接的。在一段时期内,各家银行都不再相互信任,不愿把钱借出去,除非非借不可;同样令人担心的是,银行想要借钱的时候,都不太指望其它银行会信任自己。像银行这些组织的天职正是为经济提供信用,现在这些组织都互相不信任起来了,着实让人担心。如此一来,最乐观的结果是货币政策紧缩,最坏的结果将会是付酬体系削弱,有偿付能力的公司不能迅速融资。

Underneath all the new technology and the fancy derivatives with strange acronyms is a dilemma as old as banking itself. Anyone who thinks that lending has been too loose—and many bankers do—should welcome a purge: better now than later when the imbalances would be bigger and the economy probably weaker. But if good banks fail and money for good companies dries up, the purge will wreak huge and wasteful damage on healthy parts of the economy. How likely is that?
众多金融衍生品别出心裁,人们都道不出几个缩写名称。这些衍生品和新科技一样,外表迷人,其实也给人们出了道难题,让人进退维谷, 而这道难题在银行产生时就出现了。有些人认为现行贷款政策过于宽松,很多银行家也持这个观点,他们希望整肃贷款:最好现在就开始,不要拖延,否则金融失调会加剧,很可能影响经济发展。但是,如果有潜力的银行破产,有竞争力的企业贷不到款,那么整肃贷款将会对经济中运转良好的部分带来巨大的损害,毫无意义的牺牲。这种事情发生的机率该不小吧 ?

Fear of the deep
深层问题让人恐慌

Financial crises are always about the way people do business, and not just the deals they have struck. Yet this one goes deeper than most. The spreading panic has shown up weaknesses in some of the foundations of modern finance. The past 20 years have created untold wealth. As securities and markets have steadily taken the place of old-style bank managers, the number of potential investors has grown and the cost of capital has fallen. Much good has come of that.
金融危机的发生常常和大家做生意的方式有关,而不仅仅关乎那些遭受打击的市场。比起其它大多数诱因,这个因素要意味深长一些。正在蔓延的恐慌情绪已经揭示出了现代金融制度的一些弱点,这些弱点存在于现代金融制度的根基之中。过去20年,人类创造出的财富不计可数。有价证券和证券交易所已经逐步代替过去的银行经理,有更多的人开始投资,资金风险降低。 这种制度造福多多。

But there is a price that is only now becoming apparent. Because lenders expected to be able to sell on the risk of default to someone else, they lent too easily. After all, they would not have to pick up the pieces. In theory, that risk should have been borne by the people best able to carry it. But with everybody having sold on the risk to everyone else—and the risk often being carved up, repackaged and sold again—nobody is sure where the losses are. The fear is that some risks ended up with those who least understood what they were getting into, and fear is a potent force in this disintermediated world. In the interbank market, every counterparty was potentially vulnerable. Even small amounts of bad credit can drive out good.
然而现在,这种制度的代价开始显现出来。由于贷款方可以将违约风险转嫁给其他人,他们提供贷款就变得很随意。毕竟,他们不需要去收拾烂摊子。理论上,有资格承担风险的人应该是那些有能力去承担的人,但现在人人都把风险转嫁给他人,而且常常将风险拆分、重组、又转手,没有人知道谁会真正蒙受损失。让人担心的是,许多风险最后落到了那些最不懂行的人身上。这个时代,大家都把银行里的钱取出来买证券,恐惧心理的杀伤力巨大 。银行同业的市场里,每个定约方其实都不堪一击。一小笔坏账就能抹杀良性贷款。

In theory, ratings agencies and mathematical models help investors price the risk they are taking on, even if the securities they are buying are scarcely traded. Yet when some supposedly good-quality assets proved to be worth little, people lost faith in the models and the ratings. Across the board, investors had failed to take account of how fast and how far asset prices fall when everyone wants to sell at the same time. Hard-to-sell long-term securities had been bought with short-lived debt, which left borrowers vulnerable to a change in sentiment every time the debt fell due. It does nothing to restore confidence when the biggest model-driven hedge funds had to get in new money. The people at Goldman Sachs lost a packet when something happened that their computers told them should occur only once every 100 millennia.
理论上,评级公司和数学模型可以帮助投资者估量风险,哪怕他们买的证券交易量很小。但是,有时候一些证券的评级不错,到头来却一钱不值,这时候大家就不再信任及数学模型和评级了。在证券交易所里,投资者都未能顾及,如果人人都在同一时间卖出证券,证券的价格将会跌得多么迅猛,跌幅会有多么惊人。有时投资者购买了不易卖出的长期证券,又买了短期证券,每次遇到熊市,情绪就很容易波动。套利基金最依赖模型分析,但在投资套利基金时,模型也不能帮投资者树立信心。高胜的投资者因为相信模型,赔了一次买卖,计算机显示十万年才会发生一次的情况,那次偏偏就发生了。

Reassess, reprice and then rebound
重新估价,重新评价,然后重新操作

The retreat to a new level of risk was never going to be orderly or free of casualties. Neither should it be. Bankers and investors need to suffer precisely because the methods of modern finance have been found wanting. It sounds Darwinian, but the brutal demonstration that you pay for your sins is what leads the system to evolve. Markets learn from their mistakes. Only fear will spur investors to price risks better and get them to put more effort into monitoring their counterparties.
向低风险水平撤退,总是伴随着混乱无章,代价惨痛。这是很正常的事情。正因为大家发现,现代金融手段有缺陷,所以银行家和投资者才不得不蒙受损失。残忍的一幕在上演,大家都在为自己的罪过付出代价,只有这样,金融系统才能进步。这听起来像是达尔文的滥调,但事实如此。只有恐慌才会让投资者更充分地认识风险,更用心监督定约方。

If these lessons are to sink in, central bankers must stand back—as, by and large, they have done. Every intervention now will be taken as a sign of what the regulators will do next time. If they bail out banks that have mispriced risk, the mispricing will continue. And when the central banks do step in, it should not be to save the financiers. The cost of intervention is warranted only to save the rest of the economy from the financiers' folly. By that test, central banks were right to lend money to the banks in recent days, because it ensured that a liquidity crisis did not become a solvency crisis. They may yet have to take over a failed bank, though only if that is needed to stop a run. It is still far too soon to cut interest rates.
如果人们明白了这些教训,就应该让中央银行往后站,正如到目前为止人们所努力的大体趋势那样。中央银行任何的介入都是在昭示大家,如果下次发生这样的情况,制定决策的人也会这样解决。如果决策者不让风险估价失误的银行破产,这个问题就会继续存在。如果中央银行真的要介入,目的也不应该是来拯救那些金融家。央行付出代价,仅仅应该把未受侵害的经济体从那些金融家愚蠢的行为中解救出来。在这场考验下,从近期看来,中央银行向各家银行注入资金是正确的,因为这确保了清偿危机没有变成偿付能力危机。央行还需要接管一些破产的银行,但只有在银行需要停业时央行才会这么做。现在降低利息率还为时过早。

Because this crisis taps so deeply into the newly devised structures of finance, anyone who says the worst is definitely over is either a fool or someone with a position to protect. As risk has become bewilderingly dispersed, so too has information. Nobody yet knows who will bear what losses from mortgages—because nobody can be sure what those loans are really worth. Nobody knows if tighter lending standards will oblige borrowers to raise more capital, triggering more sales in stockmarkets and more pain. Nobody knows how messy the inevitable bankruptcies will turn out to be. What markets need now is time to piece that information back together. Time before the next wave strikes.
这场危机触及了现代金融体制,有些人认为最糟糕的时刻已经过去了,这些人要么愚昧,要么就是身居官职,必须要为这种金融体制说好话。风险迅速扩散,信息也迅速传播,没有人知道谁会在抵押贷款中蒙受损失—— 因为没有人能确定手头的贷款值多少钱;没有人知道,如果货币政策会不会紧缩,那样借款人要付更多的钱,大家会抛出股票,损失更加惨重;没有人知道不可避免的银行破产会造成怎样的混乱局面。现在,市场需要的是时间,来收集信息。希望能赶在下一场风暴来临之前。
回复

使用道具 举报

236

主题

8238

帖子

3万

金币

大家网博士后

Rank: 22Rank: 22Rank: 22Rank: 22

积分
20254
发表于 2010-4-28 22:04 | 显示全部楼层
第一次翻财经方面的文章,花了好大力气。翻前几段时几乎是一个小时一段:'( ,十分不顺手。文中肯定有很多地方翻得不好,希望大家多多指点。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 注册

本版积分规则



诚聘英才|移动端|Archiver|版权声明|大家论坛 ( 京ICP备06071611号,京公网安备11010802018363号 )

GMT+8, 2021-1-19 09:58 , Processed in 0.305580 second(s), 22 queries .

Powered by Discuz!

© Comsenz Inc.

快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表