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[2007-05-03]Waiting for al-Qaeda's next bomb

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发表于 2010-3-17 21:34 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Waiting for al-Qaeda's next bomb


等待基地组织的下一个炸弹


May 3rd 2007
From The Economist print edition




A group plotting to bomb Britain has been successfully prosecuted. But the danger of al-Qaeda is growing, and the intelligence services are struggling to cope


一个密谋在英国制造爆炸的团伙被成功检举。然而,基地组织的危险性在增加,而情报机关正在努力对付。







THE young men debated endlessly how best to carry out their attack. Co-ordinated explosions on Britain's gas-distribution network were a “beautiful plan”, but difficult. Poisoning London's water supplies was a “weak idea”. Seizing an airliner and crashing it would be “easy”, while blowing up the “slags ” (loose women) dancing in the Ministry of Sound nightclub would have a “crazy” impact.


年轻人无休止地争论执行他们的攻击是多么好的一件事情。对英国天然气配送网络进行合作爆炸是一个美丽然而困难的计划。在伦敦的供水中投毒是一个“软弱的想法”。劫持一架客机并坠毁可能“容易”,而爆炸正在探测部门夜总会跳舞的“渣滓”(荡妇)会有“疯狂的”效果。






This was no idle bravado from disenchanted Muslims. Omar Khyam, now 25, and six fellow plotters had stashed away 600kg of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, the main ingredient for one or several remote-controlled bombs. At one point, during a conversation in a house in west London, one plotter asked: “Bruv, you don't think this place is bugged, do you?” No, replied Mr Khyam: “Do you know, I think we give them too much credit, bruv.”


这不是感到幻灭的伊斯兰教徒的无所事事的虚张声势。现年25岁的Omar Khyam,伙同其他六名策划者藏起了600公斤硝酸铵化肥,其主要成分可以制造一枚至数枚遥控炸弹。有一次,一个密谋者在位于伦敦西区的一栋房子中的一次对话中问:"兄弟,你认为这个地方没有被窃听,是吗?"没有,Khyam先生回答:"你知道吗,我认为我们给了他们太多信任了,兄弟."






As it turned out, their words were being recorded by Britain's domestic intelligence agency, MI5. The fertiliser had been secretly switched with an inert substance, and an MI5 agent posed as a receptionist at the storage centre where it was kept. Mr Khyam was arrested within weeks, as he was preparing to leave for Pakistan. Six others were also arrested, and an eighth suspect is awaiting trial in Canada. During a trial lasting more than a year, the court heard of other possible targets, such as blowing up the British Parliament (“a joke”, claimed Mr Khyam). On April 30th, Mr Khyam and four other suspects were sentenced to life in prison. Two others were acquitted.


正如结果表明的,他们的对话被英国国内情报机构——英国安全局(陆军情报局5处)——记录了下来。化肥被秘密调换成一种惰性物质,而一名安全局特工乔装成为放置肥料的贮藏中心的接待员。数周后,正准备离开去巴基斯坦的Khyam先生被逮捕。其他六人也被逮捕,而第八名嫌疑犯在加拿大等候审讯。在持续超过一年的审讯期间,法院得悉了其他潜在目标,例如英国国会爆炸(“一个玩笑”,Khyam先生宣称)。四月三十日,Khyam先生和其他四个嫌疑犯被判处终身监禁。其他两人被宣告无罪。






“Operation Crevice”, as the investigation was known, was at the time the biggest anti-terrorist operation in Britain. At its peak in February and March 2004, it consumed some 34,000 man-hours of intelligence and police work.The plotters' homes and cars were bugged, hidden cameras recorded them in internet cafés and undercover agents followed their movements around the clock.


人们已知的的调查机关——“缝隙行动”,那时候是英国最大的反恐机构。在高峰时的2004年二月和三月,情报和治安工作耗费大约34,000人时。密谋者的家和汽车被窃听,网吧里隐蔽的照相机记录了他们,而且卧底探员昼夜不停地追踪他们的活动。






The British authorities' ability to neutralise the bombing campaign is an important success, but it will also be remembered for a catastrophic failure: two of the four suicide-bombers who blew themselves up in London on July 7th 2005, at first said to have come “out of the blue”, had in fact been spotted with Mr Khyam's gang several times (in our picture, the two bombers flank Mr Khyam, who is second from right). But they were thought to be peripheral and were not followed up.


英国当局瓦解炸弹攻击的能力是个重要的胜利,然而也因一个灾难性事故而被记住:2005年7月7日,四名自杀炸弹袭击者中炸掉了自己的两个人,起先被认为是“突如其来”的,而实际上多次被侦查到与Khyam先生的组织有接触(如图,Khyam先生(右二)旁边的两名炸弹袭击者)。然而他们被认为是无关紧要的,没有被跟踪。






Relatives of some of the 52 victims want an independent inquiry into the London bombings. The government says this would “divert” the security services from their real job of seeking terrorists.MI5 took the unusual step of issuing a detailed rebuttal of “myths” surrounding the case. “The Security Service will never have the capacity to investigate everyone who appears on the periphery of every operation,” said its head, Jonathan Evans.


52位受害者中的一些人的亲属希望一个对伦敦爆炸案的独立调查。政府说这将使得安全部门的注意力从搜寻恐怖分子的实际工作上“转移”。英国安全局采取了非比寻常的措施——发布了对于围绕案件的“虚构的故事”(这一说法)的详细地反证。“安全部门永远都没有能力去调查出现在每次行动周围的所有人,” 安全局的头,乔纳森.埃文斯如是说。






The limits of intelligence
情报的限制




In contrast with the small, tightly organised bombing cells of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which did everything to protect their own and often gave warnings to reduce casualties, MI5 and the police now have to contend with an opposite threat: a diffuse nebula of overlapping jihadi groups, ready to destroy themselves in order to kill as many people as possible. “We are seeing networks within networks, connections within connections and links between individuals that cross local, national and international boundaries,” said Peter Clarke, the head of the counter-terrorism branch of London's Metropolitan Police, on April 24th. More than 100 people are currently awaiting trial in Britain on terrorism charges. But in Mr Clarke's view, “The only sensible assumption is that we shall be attacked again.”


与想方设法保护自己以及经常告警以减少伤亡的爱尔兰共和军小而紧密地组织的炸弹单元相比,军情五处和警方现在不得不与截然相反的威胁作斗争:交叉的吉哈德组织的扩散云翳,他们准备为杀死尽可能多的人而毁灭自己。“我们看到跨越地区、国家以及国际约束的个人之间的一个又一个网络,一个又一个联系和环节,”4月24日,伦敦都市警察的反恐部门头头彼得.克拉克如是说。伦敦有超过100人被控恐怖主义而在等待审讯。然而在克拉克先生看来,“唯一明智的假定是我们会再次被袭击。”






Britain is a particularly attractive target for global jihadists because of an unfortunate coincidence of factors: its prominence as America's ally in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fact that al-Qaeda's resurgent core leadership, based in Pakistan's frontier region, has easy access to the thousands of Britons who visit their ancestral country every year.


英国只因一些事实的巧合而成为对于全球吉哈德成员特别有吸引力的目标:在伊拉克和阿富汗的战争中是美国的杰出盟友,还有这样一个事实——坐落于巴基斯坦边疆的复生的基地组织的核心领导者易于接近每年参观祖先国度的数千英国人.






Other Western governments are closely watching developments in Britain. Europeans are worried that their own Muslim minorities could become radicalised as al-Qaeda seeks to exploit other diaspora links—Algerians in France, Moroccans in Spain and Italy, Turks in Germany. The violent re-emergence of Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French acronym, the GSPC), which has rebranded itself as al-Qaeda's branch in the Maghreb, is particularly alarming .Muslims farther south, across the largely ungoverned Sahara desert, might be indoctrinated, trained and sent back to Europe.


其他西方国家政府正紧密关注英国事态的发展。欧洲人担心当基地组织寻求利用其他散居在外的人的环节——法国的阿尔及利亚人,西班牙和意大利的摩洛哥人,德国土耳其人——的时候,自己的穆斯林少数民族会变得激进。自己改弦易辙成为基地组织在Maghreb的支部的阿尔及利亚萨拉菲斯特宣教和战斗组织的猛烈的卷土重来,特别值得警惕。更远的南方,穿过大片无人控制的撒哈拉大沙漠,伊斯兰教徒可能被教导、训练并被送回欧洲。






For America, the worry is that “clean skin” European citizens, with no known record of radicalism, could be used to attack the United States. The alleged conspiracy last summer to blow up as many as ten aircraft flying between London and the United States with liquid explosives, if proven in pending trials, would reinforce the belief that al-Qaeda has regenerated and is growing again in ambition.


对美国来说,忧虑就是,没有可知的激进主义记录的“皮肤干净的”欧洲公民也可以被用来袭击美国。去年夏天宣称用液体炸药炸毁飞行于伦敦和美国之间的十架飞机的阴谋,如被即将的庭审证实,则会让人们更加相信基地组织已经死灰复燃并且野心再次膨胀。






The first line of defence is intelligence, not least because very little information on extremists is being provided by Muslim minorities. In Britain MI5 is expanding substantially, from 1,800 staff in 2001 to a projected 3,500 in 2008. But the number of suspected terrorist networks is growing exponentially, roughly doubling every year since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.


第一道防线是情报,在一定程度上因为极少的有关极端主义者的消息由穆斯林少数民族提供。英国安全局在坚实的扩张,从2001年的1800雇员到2008年的3500雇员。然而,恐怖分子嫌疑犯的数目正呈指数增长,自从入侵伊拉克以来,每年大概翻一倍。






Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, MI5's recently departed head, said in November that her service was tracking more than 1,600 known active militants (up from 250 in 2001, according to a parliamentary report).Those extremists operated in a pool of perhaps 100,000 sympathisers who, according to one poll she cited, thought the London bombings were justified. Referring to a popular British television series about MI5, Dame Eliza said: “I wish life were like ‘Spooks’, where everything is (a) knowable and (b) soluble by six people.”


英国安全局新近离任的头头埃利莎.曼宁厄姆-布勒夫人十一月说,她的机构正在跟踪超过1600名有名的活跃的好战分子(从2001年的250名增长至此,根据议会的一份报告)。那些极端主义者依靠大概100000名同情者运作,根据她引用的一个民意测验,这些人认为伦敦爆炸案是正义的。谈到英国流行的一部关于军情五处的电视系列片的时候,埃利莎夫人说:“我希望生活能像‘幽灵’一样,什么事情都是(a)可知的并且(b)可被六个人解决。”








In fact, surveillance uses manpower intensively. Dozens of people are required to keep track of a single suspect 24 hours a day. Those deemed to pose a “threat to life” take precedence, but these days there are so many of them that MI5 has to decide which threat to life appears to be the most acute. Indeed, some security officials suspect al-Qaeda may be deliberately flooding Britain with terrorist plots in the hope of overwhelming its defences.


实际上,监视密集地使用人力资源。几十个被要求一天二十四小时不断追踪一个嫌疑犯。那些认为遭到“生命威胁”的人占主导地位,然而这些天,这种人太多了以至于军情五处不得不判定哪个生命威胁看起来更严重。甚至,一些安全官员怀疑基地组织故意使用如潮汹涌的恐怖分子密谋来试图压倒它的防御。






Shadows on the path
路上的暗影




Operation Crevice was a turning point in the British authorities' understanding of the threat posed by al-Qaeda. Until early 2004, the main terrorist danger to Britain was deemed to come from extremists outside the country. At most, some British Muslims were thought to be supporting such groups abroad and sometimes setting out to join them in jihad.


缝隙行动是英国当局理解基地组织所造成的威胁的转折点。直到2004年初,英国仍然认为主要的恐怖分子威胁来自国外的极端主义者。至多不过一些英国穆斯林被认为支持这些组织,并且曾经着手加入他们的圣战。







In April 2003 two Britons of Pakistani descent set off explosive belts outside a beach-front bar in Tel Aviv, killing three Israelis. At the time, says Mr Clarke, Britain was “a net exporter of terrorism”. The worst fears of the police came true on July 7th 2005, when four Britons (three of Pakistani descent, one of West Indian) blew themselves up on the London Underground and on a bus. Although security forces had been expecting attacks, the fact that they were dealing with suicide-bombings came as a surprise. Just a month earlier the Joint Intelligence Committee, which draws up assessments from information gathered by several intelligence services, had concluded that suicide-attacks were not likely and would not become the norm in Europe. After all, the Madrid bombs in 2004 had been detonated with mobile telephones, while Mr Khyam and his plotters also planned to use a remote-controlled device.


2003年4月,两个巴基斯坦裔英国人在特拉维夫海边一间酒吧外引爆身上的爆炸物,杀死了三名以色列人。克拉克先生说,那时候英国是“恐怖主义的净出口国”。2005年7月7日,当四名英国人(三名巴基斯坦裔,一名西印度群岛裔)在伦敦地铁和公共汽车上引爆自己,警方最坏的担心成为事实。尽管安全部门已经预料到有袭击,他们正在处理的是自杀炸弹袭击这一事实还是令人大吃一惊。仅仅一个月之前,当依据若干情报机关搜集的情报来草拟评估的时候,联合情报委员会得出结论——自杀式袭击不可能也不会变成欧洲的规范。毕竟,2004年马德里爆炸是用手机引爆,而Khyam先生和他的策划者们也计划使用遥控装置。






More surprises were to come. During the investigation into the July 7th bombings (and into the alleged attempted bombings two weeks later), MI5 soon discovered that the two main instigators of the successful attack, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, had crossed their path before, particularly on the fringes of Operation Crevice. Khan had been spotted on five separate occasions and had even been followed, but was not identified. MI5 picked up some of Khan's conversations with Mr Khyam, and said these dealt mainly with financial scams. But a transcript shows that during one rambling conversation they also talked about doing “operations” from Pakistan. At one point Khan asks Mr Khyam: “Are you really a terrorist, eh?”


更多的惊讶随之而来。在调查7月7日爆炸案(以及宣称两周后未遂的爆炸)期间,不久军情五处便发现成功袭击的两个主要策划者——穆罕默德.西迪克.可汗和谢赫扎德.坦威尔——之前出现在他们的视线里,特别是缝隙行动的边缘。可汗在五个不同场合被发现并被跟踪,但是没有被认出来。军情五处捡获可汗同Khyam先生的交谈,并且说这些勾当主要关于金融诡计。然而一个副本显示,在一次漫无边际的谈话中他们也提到做些巴基斯坦的“业务”。一次,可汗问Khyam先生:“呃,你真是一个恐怖分子吗?”






After the arrest of the Crevice plotters in March 2004, MI5 drew up a list of 55 suspects who had come into contact with Mr Khyam's group. Fifteen were deemed “essential” targets; Khan and Tanweer were on the lower-priority list of 40 “desirable” suspects who should be followed up when resources permitted.


在2004年3月逮捕缝隙阴谋者之后,军情五处草拟了一份接触Khyam先生组织55名嫌疑人名单。十五个人被认为是“重要”目标;可汗和坦威尔在较低优先级的四十名“令人想要的”嫌疑人名单中,在资源允许的情况下,这些人会被跟踪。






By July 2004, however, MI5 and the police diverted their manpower into another, even bigger investigation in which one suspect, Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam, pleaded guilty last November to planning several possible attacks and received a 40-year prison sentence. Mr Barot had considered a series of attacks, including a radioactive “dirty bomb” and a plot to blow up limousines filled with gas cylinders in London. He had also planned attacks in America. Six others have pleaded guilty to assisting him, while a seventh alleged conspirator is standing trial.


然而到2004年7月,军情五处和警方转而把人力投入另一个更大的调查当中,其中一个名叫迪伦.巴罗特的从印度教徒变成伊斯兰教信徒的嫌疑人,为去年十一月策划数次可能袭击的罪行辩护,被判处四十年监禁。巴罗特先生预谋了一系列袭击,包括一枚放射性“脏弹”和在伦敦炸毁装满煤气罐的豪华客车的计划。他也计划袭击美国。其他六人为协助巴罗特的罪名辩护,而宣称是同谋者的第七个人则正在接受审讯。






Mr Clarke admitted that at the time of Mr Barot's arrest police did not have any evidence admissible in court. Only at the end of the 14-day detention period then allowed by law did police find the required evidence on Mr Barot's computers.


克拉克先生承认,巴罗特先生被拘捕的时候,警察没有任何可被法庭采纳的证据。直到法律允许的十四天拘留期限快结束的时候,警察才巴罗特先生的电脑里发现需要的证据。






By the time of the London bombings in July 2005, investigators still did not know (or had not tried hard enough to find out) Khan's name. The first clues came from the wreckage of the London Underground. A SIM card identified a smashed mobile telephone as belonging to one of the men who had been in contact with Mr Khyam (although at the time the owners of pre-paid phones did not have to provide identity details). The picture from a passport found at the site was circulated among surveillance staff, who identified Khan as one of those seen during Operation Crevice. After the London bombings Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Pakistani-American computer programmer now in jail in America on terrorism-related charges, identified newspaper pictures of Khan as someone called “Ibrahim”, who attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Pakistan with Mr Khyam (alias “Ausman”). But there is some dispute over whether he was shown the right surveillance pictures of Khan in 2004.


2005年7月伦敦爆炸的时候,调查人员仍然不知道可汗的名字(或者没有尽最大努力去追查)。第一个线索来自伦敦地铁的残留物。一只打碎的手机的SIM卡识别出属于与Khyam先生接触过的其中一个人(尽管当时预付电话的所有者不必提供详细身份资料)。现场发现的一本护照的照片在监视人员中传阅,他们指认可汗是缝隙行动中发现的人中的一个。伦敦爆炸之后,被指控与恐怖主义有关呆在监狱的巴基斯坦裔美国计算机程序员,穆罕默德.朱奈德.巴巴尔看到可汗的报纸照片,认出他是与Khyam先生(别名“奥斯曼”)一起参加巴基斯坦的基地组织训练营的名叫“易卜拉欣”的一个人。然而有一些有关他是否看到了2004年可汗的正确的监视照片的争议。






Critics of MI5 say it should have been able to join the dots. The House of Commons' Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded last year that the decision not to give Khan greater priority was, given limited resources, “understandable”. Not everyone is convinced, however, that the committee saw all the material the security agencies had. Rather than agreeing to an independent inquiry, Tony Blair, the prime minister, has asked the ISC to take another look instead.


军情五处的批评者说本来就应该能够加入特征。去年,众议院公共情报与安全委员会得出结论——不给与可汗更大的优先权的决定,在给定有限资源的条件下,是“可以理解的”。然而不是人人都对委员会看到了所有安全机构的资料这一说法表示信服。首相托尼.布莱尔已经要求ISC采取另外的调查作为替代,而不赞成独立调查。






The Pakistan connection
巴基斯坦联系




As MI5 went back through its records, it found it had other information on Khan (but under a slightly different spelling) dating back to 2003, when he was identified as a “facilitator” for extremists in Pakistan. Mr Khyam, too, had originally come to the attention of counter-terrorism officials in 2003 as a suspected “courier” carrying cash and outdoor equipment for Kashmiri militants. Clearly the security agencies had, and still have, great difficulty in identifying who, among the many sympathisers and supporters of jihadi causes abroad, will make the transition to carrying out attacks in Britain. There is no obvious profile of a suicide-bomber, and both Mr Khyam and Khan were comparatively well integrated into British society.


当军情五处追溯档案之时,发现它有有关可汗的其他信息(但是在一个稍有不同的拼写之下),回溯到2003年,那时他被认定为巴基斯坦极端主义者的“服务商”。Khyam先生最初被反恐官员注意是在2003年,他被怀疑为给克什米尔好战分子运送钞票和露天设备的“投递员”。安全机构对于从那么多吉哈德海外事业的支持者和同情者当中识别出谁会转移到英国并实施袭击,显然曾有并且仍然有极大的困难。没有自杀炸弹袭击者的清楚轮廓,Khyam和可汗先生两个人都相当好地融入了英国社会。







A central factor in radicalising some British Muslims has undoubtedly been Britain's involvement in the war in Iraq, but other factors are at play. Militant preachers, and the proliferation of jihadi websites and internet chat rooms, have helped to create a climate in which many Muslims accept al-Qaeda's simple unifying narrative: Muslims across the world are being attacked, from Algeria to Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya and Kashmir; Muslims everywhere must therefore rise up against their principal oppressor, America, and its fellow Western “crusaders”.


英国穆斯林变得激进的主要因素无庸置疑的是英国牵涉进了伊拉克战争,但是其他因素也在发挥作用。好战的鼓吹者以及吉哈德网站和网络聊天室的迅速扩散,帮助制造了一种气氛——在这种气氛下,许多穆斯林接受了基地组织朴素而统一的叙述:从阿尔及利亚到巴勒斯坦,伊拉克,车臣和克什米尔,全世界的穆斯林正在被袭击;因此各地的穆斯林必须起来反对主要的压迫者——美国和它的西方“十字军”同伙。






Security sources say jihadi activity has moved away from mosques to clubs, gyms and private homes, where it is harder to monitor. The internet has proved to be an “ungoverned space” where al-Qaeda and its followers have thrived. On April 23rd, a British court started hearing the trial of three men accused of inciting terrorism overseas. They include Younis Tsouli, of Moroccan origin, who is alleged to be a prolific internet propagandist going by the name of “Irhabi 007”, or “Terrorist 007”. He and another suspect are also accused of conspiracy to murder in a case linked to suspects arrested in Bosnia. “Of all the things I have seen over the past few years,” says Mr Clarke, “one of the most worrying has been the speed and apparent ease with which young men can be turned into suicidal terrorists.”


安全渠道表明,吉哈德的活动已经从清真寺,体育馆转移到更难监控的俱乐部和私人住宅。网络已经被证明是“无管制空间”,在那里,基地组织及其追随者们茁壮成长。4月23日,英国一个法庭开始对被控在国外煽动恐怖主义的三个人的开庭审讯。他们包括出身摩洛哥的尤尼斯.特苏里,他被指证为一个以“伊尔哈比007”,或者“恐怖分子007”的名字进行活动的多产的网络传道者。他和另外一名嫌疑人,在与在波斯尼亚被捕的嫌疑犯有关系的案件里,还被指控犯有串谋谋杀罪。“过去几年,我看到的所有事情当中,”克拉克先生说,“最令人担忧的事情之一,就是年轻人被转化为自杀性恐怖分子的速度和显而易见的安逸。






Self-starting terrorism is an ever-present danger. But over several investigations, counter-terrorism officials have usually found direct links leading back to Pakistan, often to al-Qaeda figures. Key British suspects travel back to Pakistan for training and indoctrination. Mr Khyam and Khan are alleged to be linked, through a British middleman, to Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, the alleged number three in al-Qaeda, who was taken to Guantánamo Bay last week.


自发的恐怖主义是永存的威胁。然而经过若干调查,反恐官员们通常会发现与巴基斯坦基地组织人物的直接联系。英国的重要嫌疑犯旅行回到巴基斯坦进行训练和教育。Khyam和可汗先生指证通过一个英国中间人与阿卜杜勒.哈蒂尔有联系,这是一个伊拉克人,基地组织的三号人物,上周被带到关塔那摩湾。






This is both reassuring and alarming. It indicates that, for the moment, British networks still need outside help. At the same time, it shows that al-Qaeda has regenerated itself despite its eviction from Afghanistan and the killing or arrest of several key figures. Its networks, says Mr Clarke, “are large, fluid, mobile and incredibly resilient”. Counter-terrorism experts disagree on what is more important: the “push” provided by al-Qaeda leaders seeking to mastermind attacks in the West, or the “pull” of local extremists who adopt al-Qaeda's ideology and modes of action.


这既让人安慰又让人警惕。这表明,此时英国网络仍然需要外援。同时说明,尽管被从阿富汗驱逐并且数个关键人物或被杀或被擒,基地组织已经重建。克拉克先生说,它的网络,“巨大,流动,灵活且难以置信地富有弹性”。反恐专家对以下哪个更重要有不同的意见:由基地组织领导者寻求策划袭击西方带来的“推力”,还是采用基地组织意识形态和行为方式的本地极端主义者的“拉力”。






Either way, in Britain al-Qaeda has found an easy source of recruits. Sometimes they are amateurish, but even unsophisticated attacks can cause devastation. In any case, security sources say, other networks are learning from the mistakes of their peers, and from the information gleaned in court prosecutions.


不管怎样,基地组织已经在英国发现了便利的兵源。有时候,他们是业余的,但是哪怕简单的袭击也能带来毁灭。安全渠道表示,无论如何,其他网络正在从他们同辈的错误以及法庭检举所搜集的情报里获得借鉴。






The British government has reorganised its counter-terrorism effort. Four joint police and MI5 regional offices are being established to strengthen counter-terrorism work outside London. Meanwhile, the Home Office is losing responsibility for probation and prisons to a separate ministry of justice, freeing it, in theory, to focus on security, terrorism and immigration. Within the department a special office for security and counter-terrorism has been created, while the prime minister will chair monthly meetings of a national security committee.


英国政府已经改组了反恐力量。警察和军情五处的四个联合区域办事处正在建立,以加强伦敦外部的反恐工作。同时,内政部把鉴定和监禁的职能分派给了一个独立的司法部门,理论上减轻了负担,把力量集中于安全,恐怖主义和移民。部门内建立了一个专门负责安全和反恐的办公室,而首相将每月召开一次国家安全委员会会议。






The struggle for Muslim allegiance
与穆斯林的忠诚战斗




However, the problem goes far beyond the security bureaucracy. The effort to counter radicalisation in Britain has barely begun. The secretary of state for communities and local government, Ruth Kelly, has announced a “hearts and minds” campaign. It includes strengthening moderate imams and preventing mosques from being taken over by extremists.


然而,问题远远超过安全官僚机构。英国的反激进工作勉强已经开始。负责社会和地方政府的国务卿鲁思.凯利,宣告了“民心”运动开始。包括强化温和的阿訇,阻止极端主义者接管清真寺。






But extremist thinking is often best confronted on its own terms. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the authorities send Muslim scholars into prisons to try to convince jihadi detainees that their actions run counter to Islamic jurisprudence. In Britain, though, prisons are still a recruiting ground for jihadi groups.


但是极端主义者的想法经常恰好遭遇自身的局限。在诸如沙特阿拉伯和也门这些国家,当局派穆斯林学者进监狱来试图说服吉哈德囚犯,告诉他们,他们的行为与伊斯兰教的教义背道而驰。然而在英国,监狱仍然是吉哈德组织的新兵基地。






Those fighting terrorism are acutely aware that much of their work, based on intelligence, is regarded with suspicion. Tensions with many Muslims have been exacerbated by raids, searches and incidents such as the shooting of a man (accidentally, say police) during a raid in the Forest Gate neighbourhood of London in 2006, when police searched in vain for evidence of a chemical bomb.


对抗恐怖主义的那些人敏锐的意识到他们许多的以情报为基础工作,是被怀疑的。许多穆斯林的不安因为搜捕,调查和一些突发事件而加剧,例如:2006年,当警察在邻近伦敦的Forest Gate地区气急败坏地搜索化学炸弹证据的时候,枪击了一名男子。






Counter-terrorism officials feel frustrated that the succession of court cases, such as the conviction of Mr Khyam and his fellow plotters, is failing to build more public trust. Partly this is because it can take two years for cases to come to court, and partly it is because of legal restrictions on public reporting before trials (and increasingly during and even after them, to avoid prejudicing other prosecutions).


诸如给Khyam和他的阴谋者同伙的定罪之类的法庭判例的成功,在建立更多公众信任方面失败了,这使得反恐官员们大受挫折。原因一部分因为案件送交法庭需要两年时间,一部分因为对于审判前(审判中甚至审判后更是如此,以避免对其他检举造成偏见)公开报告的法律约束。






Greater public trust is vital to improving the flow of information about extremists. For the moment, says Mr Clarke, most terrorism-related investigations begin with intelligence gathered from foreign governments, intelligence agencies or electronic eavesdropping. In other words, many Muslims are reluctant to report co-religionists to the police, even if they disagree with their militant views. Unless the code of silence is broken, more bombers will inevitably get through.


更大的公众信任是改善有关极端主义者信息流所不可缺少的。克拉克先生说,此时此刻,大多数与恐怖主义有关的调查以从外国政府,情报机关或者电子窃听所搜集的情报为起点。换句话说,许多穆斯林不愿把共同信仰者报告给警方,尽管他们不同意他们的好战观点。除非沉默的规则被打破,否则更多的炸弹袭击者不可避免地达到目的。
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发表于 2010-3-17 21:34 | 显示全部楼层
第一段:Co-ordinated explosions 应该是“协作地爆炸”
    Ministry of SOUND 为什么翻译成探测部门?
第四段:undercover agents 翻成“便衣”是否好一些?
第十段:pending  漏了 
    “则会加强对于基地组织已经死灰复燃并且野心再次膨胀的相信。”倒得不舒服
第十一段:not least 这个意思心里明白,但是不知道应该怎么明确地翻出来
第十九段:detention period 应该是“拘留期”吧
第二十段:wreckage 残留物的意思。。。


最后一部分还没看,你看看这些怎么样。。。
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终身成就奖英语达人才华横溢优秀斑竹二级笔译三级笔译

发表于 2010-3-17 21:35 | 显示全部楼层
首先非常感谢  ELLa ,让我终于盼来了点评!

第一段Co-ordinated explosions ,已经修改,至于Ministry of SOUND我当时想的应该死侦测部门,完全是照我自己的理解而意译的;
第四段undercover agents ,有点惭愧,完全是跟着《红色警戒》里面的那个家伙,他并非便衣那么简单,更像是卧底,带着伪装去偷钱。google解释也是卧底,不过意思总觉得……:Q
十段,已经更改
十一段,可能要花一百个字以上才能解释清楚:L
十九段,呵呵,当时有点草率,google了一下,确实是“拘留期限”。:P
二十段已经更改,Ella真是细心阿!
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