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[经济学人] [2009.05.19]The revolution within 内部革命

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发表于 2010-4-28 18:00 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
The revolution within
May 14th 2009
From The Economist print edition

The way banks manage risk—including how they reward managers for taking it—will change greatly
银行风险管理及经理由此所得薪酬,均将巨变。


THE changes to the environment in which banks operate—tougher regulation, higher capital requirements and scarcer funding—will have a dramatic impact on the way that banks are managed. But banks are also reflecting hard on some fundamental internal questions, such as how to manage risk, compensation and growth itself. Too many bosses and shareholders accepted years of double-digit returns without probing the sources and sustainability of those profits. “No one was asking the ‘Columbo’ questions,” says Toos Daruvala of McKinsey, a consultancy.
监管力度加大,资本要求提高,筹资渠道减少,银行运作环境的变化将给其管理带来剧变。但就一些基本的内部问题,诸如风险管理、薪酬、企业发展等,银行却没有太多反思。这几年来,太多的老板、持股人的利润一直保持两位数,但他们却从没有想过这些利润的来源,也没想过这样的利润他们能享受多久。正如顾问公司麦肯锡(McKinsey)的托什•达鲁瓦拉(Toos Daruvala)所言,“没有人像可伦坡(Columbo)1一样提出问题。”

The most basic of these questions, particularly for banks with large wholesale operations, is what kind of businesses they want to be. The bubble was characterised by a game of copycat, in which banks strove to match the returns of their most profitable rivals by piling headlong into asset classes where they were lagging, irrespective of the risks. “The securities industry was based on revenue, not on risk-adjusted returns,” says a bank boss.
而其中最基本的一个问题在于,这些银行究竟希望做哪种生意,这个问题对于大批量经营的银行来说尤为重要。这场泡沫的一大特点就是跟风比赛,比赛中银行无视其中的风险,一头栽进其落后于他人的资产类,以求赶超其收益最佳的对手。某银行家甚至说,“证券市场的基础是收入,而非风险调整后的收益(risk-adjusted returns)。”

Consultants armed with league tables and presentations full of “gap analysis” increased the pressure on sluggards to catch up. Mr Winters of JPMorgan Chase recalls how executives at the bank worried about its underperformance in fixed-income markets. “We used to beat ourselves to death about it and wonder ‘what aren’t we getting right?’ Now we know.” For the foreseeable future, managers will think harder about where they have a competitive advantage over rivals, not where they don’t.
而就很多不积极参与的人来说,那些手持同行绩效排行,报告中充斥着“缺口分析”(gap analysis) 2的顾问无疑给他们增加了压力。摩根大通的温特斯(Winters)回忆起银行主管对其在固定收入市场上绩效不良忧心忡忡的情景时说,“那时候,我们真想为此杀了自己,也会想,‘到底哪里出问题了呢?’现在我们总算是知道了。”就可见的未来而言,经理们将会更加努力地思索其竞争优势在哪,而非自己在哪方面没有竞争优势。

Besides working out what they are good at, banks must decide how much risk they want to take. Helped along by the ratcheting-up of capital charges in trading books and other planned regulatory changes, a sweeping shift in risk appetite is already under way. There are obviously distinctions between firms: Goldman Sachs has maintained a stronger bias towards risk exposure than Morgan Stanley, for example. But in general proprietary risk-taking is being scaled back drastically. Risk capital will reside outside the banking system, in hedge funds and private-equity firms, much more than before.
除了发掘自己的优势,银行还必须决定自己愿意承担多大的风险。另外由于交易账户(trading book)3获取资本的代价不断增加以及其他既定规则改变,这几个因素共同导致了风险偏好(risk appetite)4的巨变。诚然,不同公司有显著的差别,比如说,高盛比起摩根士丹利,就更倾向于风险敞口(risk exposure)5。但普遍而言,专有资金冒险(proprietary )25已大幅度下降。比起过去,风险资金将更多存在于银行系统外的对冲基金和私人直接投资公司中。

The likes of Deutsche Bank, UBS and Credit Suisse have all unveiled strategies to cut their proprietary activities in illiquid markets and focus on high-volume “flow” businesses: for example, helping clients to manage exchange-rate and interest-rate risk. That means leaving some moneymaking opportunities on the table, a most unbubble-like thing to do. “We could have held on to certain assets and made money now but we cannot have this kind of risk irrespective of future potential,” says Josef Ackermann, the boss of Deutsche Bank.
而德意志银行、瑞士联合银行、瑞士信贷银行之属,业已采取若干策略,减少其用自己专有资金在非流动市场的投机活动,关注大额“流动”交易,例如,替顾客管理汇率、利率风险。那也就意味着,要放弃某些赚钱的机会,这样产生泡沫的几率最小。德意志银行行长约瑟夫•阿克曼(Josef Ackermann)表示“我们现在当然可以继续经营某些资产,以此获利,但我们也不能无视未来发展,走这步险棋。

Fireproofing构建防火墙

Banks are also taking measures to ensure that a poor year in more volatile businesses cannot overwhelm a decent year in steadier ones. And they are reviewing the appropriate mix of earnings between divisions, given the capital-intensity and risk profile of some activities. The firewalls between businesses are being fortified, too, so that managers have a clearer idea of the standalone profitability of each division.
银行还采取了一些措施,免得业务大波动的混乱年会抹杀业务稳定的混乱年,也开始考虑到资产密集程度(capital-intensity)和风险概况(risk profile),评估各种商业活动收入的恰当组合。同样的,他们也加固了各行业间的防火墙,这样经理对于单一活动能带来的收益能有个更清晰的认识。

UBS was especially guilty of underpricing its internal funding, letting its investment bank take advantage of the bank’s cheap overall cost of funds without paying an appropriate premium for the risks it was taking. The Swiss bank has reorganised itself to ensure that businesses are more autonomous and are funded at market rates. Such changes arguably have more impact than any regulatory reforms. “The real revolution will be within the businesses,” says Charles Roxburgh of McKinsey, “as managers see real detail on who is making money and how.”
至于低价出借其内部资金,让其手下的投资银行有机可乘,不用因其所冒风险支付一定的“保险费”,UBS实在其罪难逃。重组后,该银行各商业活动更加自立,也以市场汇率筹资。比起任何监管上的改革,据称这种变革成效更大。麦肯锡的查尔斯•罗克斯伯勒(Charles Roxburgh)认为,“当管理人员真正看清了谁在以怎样的方式赚钱,真正的革命即将从内部展开。”

The mechanics of risk management are also in upheaval. Articulating how much risk to take or deciding how much to charge internally for a certain activity is less clear now that many banks’ risk models have proved unreliable. (The impression of additional uncertainty is itself partly illusory: the clarity models provided during the bubble was misleading.)
风险管理的过程亦在经历剧变。现在,由于危机证实银行许多模型不甚可靠,所以要说明冒多大的风险,针对某业务,内部付出的代价,愈发难辨。(不确定性增加本身就似是而非,泡沫时期提供的具体模型误导了大家)


In truth, the crisis will make models more useful. They will be using data from a whole economic cycle rather than looking myopically at a period of exceptionally high returns. The improved risk profile of banks’ borrowers also means they will have better data to work with. Methodological improvements will capture the relationships between institutions—the effect on its peers of Lehman Brothers going bust, say—as well as their independent risk profiles, which are commonly assessed by a measure called “value at risk” (VAR). Tobias Adrian of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton University have proposed a measure called CoVAR, or “conditional value at risk”, which tries to capture the risk of loss in a portfolio due to other institutions being in trouble. Taking account of such spillover effects greatly increases some banks’ value at risk (see chart 9).
实际上,这场危机会让模型更加实用了。银行将抛弃过去鼠目寸光,只从有极高回报的时期提取数据,转而寻求整个经济循环中的数据代入这些模型。改善借贷者的风险概况分析意味着银行也能得到更好的数据。方法上的改进会计入机构间的关系(比如,雷曼兄弟破产对同行产生的影响)及各机构本身的风险概况的关系,这通常使用风险价值方法(VAR法)7进行估测。纽约联邦储备银行的托比亚斯•艾登(Tobias Adrian)和普林斯顿的马库斯•布鲁那米尔(Markus Brunnermeier)则提出了CoVAR法,即条件风险价值法,这种方法试图计算在其他机构陷入困境是投资组合损失的风险。评估时考虑到这种溢出效应(spillover effects)8会大幅度增加银行的在险价值(图9)

Despite such improvements, risk managers are well aware of the need to beef up their qualitative controls too. Stress tests, designed to think through how institutions cope with periods of pressure, will become more important to boards as they seek to define institutions’ risk appetite. They will also become more important to shareholders. Bank of New York Mellon has started to include figures in its earnings statements showing what could happen to its capital under various scenarios.
然而尽管模型上有些改进,但风险经理也深知自己还应加强质量控制。压力测试其目的就是为了判断某机构会如何度过压力期的,董事会在寻求界定机构的风险偏好时压力测试将变得更加重要,这点对于持股人也是一样的。纽约银行梅隆公司已经开始在其收益表(earning statements)中加入某些数据,以显示不同环境对其资本产生的影响。

Stress tests will also become more demanding. Take the assumptions about how long liquidity can disappear for. Measures such as VAR seek to capture the effects of a single explosive event within a relatively short period. This crisis, says Koos Timmermans, chief risk officer of ING, a Dutch bank, has been “more like slow death by torture”. Peter Neu of the Boston Consulting Group says stress tests must also become more “coherent”. Too many banks defined stress events in isolation—asking what kind of losses they might sustain in the event of, say, a 20% stockmarket fall without asking what sorts of changes in the economic climate would prompt a fall that big.
同样,也会有更严格的压力测试。以流动性缺失时间为例,VAR一类的方法关注的是短时间内单个事件造成的影响。丹麦ING银行风险主管库斯•迪莫斯曼(Koos Timmermans)则认为,这场危机中,银行“更像是慢慢被折磨致死。” 波士顿咨询集团(Boston Consulting Group)的彼得•诺伊(Peter Neu)则认为,这些压力测试也必须更加“连贯”。太多太多的银行孤立地看待压力测试,总是在问,比方说,股价下跌了20%这样的情况下他们能够承受多大的损失这类问题,却不去考虑经济环境中那种变化会带来那么大的下跌。

Even Goldman Sachs, widely regarded as the best manager of risk in the industry, did not foresee quite how bad things could get. The bank’s most demanding pre-crisis stress test—known as the “wow”, or worst of the worst, test—took the most negative events to have happened in each market since 1998 and assumed that they got 30% worse and all happened at the same time. That still wasn’t pessimistic enough.
尽管业界普遍认为高盛在风险管理上是最优秀的银行,但它也没能预料到事情会落入这般地步。危机前高盛最苛刻的压力测试,WOW测试(即worst of the worst,最坏估计法),汇集了自1988年以来的所有负面时间,假定他们在严重程度上再增加30%,还假定他们同时发生,即使如此,还是不够悲观。

Banks must revisit their assumptions about how effective their defences are against multiple risks. The crisis will live long in the collective memory for showing that all markets can become illiquid and all risks are correlated, removing many of the benefits of diversification. “The fourth quarter of last year was remarkable for showing how fragile the system has actually turned out to be,” says Wilson Ervin, chief risk officer of Credit Suisse.
而银行的抵御手段对多重风险的成效如何,这个论题也得捡回来讨论了。这场危机证实了,原来所有的市场流动性都可能戛然停止,原来风险之间竟是息息相关,这场危机也卷走了投资组合带来的不少利益,由于上述特征,这场危机将长存在人们的记忆中。瑞士信贷首席风险执行官威尔森•欧文(Wilson Ervin)也说,“去年第四季度确实引人注目,我们看到了该系统原来是如此不堪一击。”

The inadequacy of specific hedges, something known as “basis risk”, also came as a shock to many. A corporate bond and a cash-collateralised credit-default swap written on the same company ought to offset each other—if the company looks likely to default, the bond will fall and the swap rise. In late 2008 the system-wide evaporation of liquidity meant that banks could lose money on both.
由于具体的套期保值不当造成的基差风险(basis risk)也让很多人大为震惊,同一家公司的企业债券及其现金担保的信用违约互换(cash-collateralised credit-default swap,CDS)11本应相互抵消:比如,如果某公司可能资不抵债,那么其债券价格将下降,而CDS的价格会上升。然而在08年底,整个体系的流动性停滞,带来的结果可能就是公司两种产品价格都下跌。

A degree of calm has returned to the markets since then, reversing some of the losses banks suffered from basis risk. The amount of counterparty risk in the system will be reduced greatly by central clearing-houses for credit-default swaps. But confidence in hedges and market liquidity as a way of mitigating risk has been badly damaged. In response, banks will use a simpler set of palliatives. They will take greater account of their gross as well as net exposures. They will charge more for taking on risk on clients’ behalf. And to the extent that they continue to package and sell securitised assets to investors, they will reduce the amount of inventory they hold.
自那以后,市场已经已经有所缓和,银行由于基差风险收到的损失也有所回收。中央票据交易所监管CD之后12,也将大大减少该体系中的交易对手风险(counterparty risk)。过去人们对套期保值和市场流动性的信心减轻了市场风险,但这种信心现在遭到严重的破坏。因此,银行将用一套更简单的措施以减轻风险。届时,他们将对总风险敞口将及净敞口给予更多考虑,再为顾客承担风险时收取的费用的费用也将更高。银行还将继续其打包(package)及证券化资产出售的业务,针对存在的风险,他们将会减少其手头的数量。

A game of pay sense薪资博弈
All of these aspects of risk management, from models to hedges, are important. But another risk-related question—bankers’ pay—has dominated the public debate on the industry’s failures. Pay has been the touchstone issue of the financial crisis, vilified both as the incentive that drove bankers to take foolish risks as well as the most inequitable feature of an industry that makes obscene profits in the good times and comes crawling to the taxpayer when it gets into trouble. From the bonuses paid to executives at AIG, a monumentally failed insurer, to the expensive tastes of John Thain, a former head of Merrill Lynch, and the huge pension granted to Sir Fred Goodwin, a former boss of RBS, pay has captured the public’s attention, far more than the banks’ many other failings.
从模型到套期保值,风险管理的各个方面都是重要的举措,但另一个风险相关问题,已成为公众对业界衰败讨论的热点:银行家的薪酬。薪酬已成金融危机的试金石,既被诬蔑成银行家冒大风险的动因,又被中伤为银行业最不公平的特点,繁荣时期赚取令人咂舌的利润,遇到麻烦了,就向纳税人摇尾乞怜从穷途末路的保险巨头AIG的分红一事,到美林前总裁约翰•塞恩的奢侈的喜好,及至苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)给弗雷德•古德温爵士(Sir Fred Goodwin)的巨额退休金,薪酬成为公众关注的焦点,相比而言,银行其他的过失简直就无足轻重。

Managers admit privately that things got way out of line. “It was better to be an employee than a shareholder,” says a bank’s chief executive. The traditional argument against changing pay structures has been that no institution could move unilaterally without competitors poaching its best people. Now, no bank can fail to alter its compensation policy without having its executives publicly humiliated by politicians and the news media, and frowned upon by regulators.
私底下,银行经理也承认,现在事情实在太过分了。某银行的CEO感慨,“当个普通员工都比股东好啊。”在薪资结构(pay structures)变革问题上,传统的观点是,任何机构要想单方面改革,其竞争对手必然会挖走其精英,现在,要是哪家银行薪资制度改革失败,其管理人员必然会被政客和媒体公开嘲讽,亦让监管方龙颜不悦。

The broad thrust of the coming changes on pay is clear. Banks will tie compensation more closely to performance and spread rewards over longer periods. It should be said that neither idea is foreign to the industry. Bonus pools based on profits (though not revenues, an indefensible practice) may be seen as a problem now but are clearly more closely tied to performance than a fixed base salary. Awards of shares were common within the industry before the crisis and caused employees, those of Lehman Brothers included, to suffer vast losses when share prices dropped. What the industry as a whole did not do well enough was to design pay so that it better reflected long-term risk.
接下来在这方面的改变的方向也很明显。银行内工资和绩效间的联系加强,奖励分配长期化。应该说,业界对这两种方法都不陌生。以利润为基础的津贴(bonus pool)(而非以收入为基础,这种方法实在站不住脚的)可能是个问题,但明显的,相比固定工资,它和绩效的联系已经加强了。危机前,银行业往往以分股为奖励方式,结果,股价下降时,员工遭受了巨大的损失,雷曼兄弟的员工也不能例外。整体来说,这个行业做得不够的在于未能设计好薪酬体系,使其能够更好地反映银行的长期风险。


According to a survey of industry practices published by the Institute of International Finance (IIF) in March, many banks still fail to use risk-adjusted measures either to calculate the size of their bonus pool or to allocate it. That will change (see chart 10). Economic-capital models, which calculate the use of capital based on assumptions about expected losses, will be more widely used to set bankers’ pay in future. The bonus/malus structure introduced by UBS in 2008, whereby a cash portion of a bonus award is held back at the end of a financial year and reduced if targets are not met in subsequent years, will also become more common as institutions seek to track and reward the performance of senior managers over time.
三月份国际金融研究院(Institute of International Finance, IIF)一份行业行为的调查报告指出,仍有许多银行在评估或分发奖金时,都还未使用风险调整绩效度量方法(risk-adjusted performance measures, RAPM)15。这种状况将得到改变。未来,银行在决定薪酬时将会广为应用经济资本模型,该模型通过预测损失,决定资本数额。2008年,UBS引入一套奖惩体系,规定现金红利只得在一个财政年度(financial year)16最末发放,倘若来年既定标准未达,红利就将减少。随着各机构在追踪、奖励高级经理绩效方面投入精力,它们必将效仿UBS的做法。

Some banks will be more sophisticated still. With costs and capital under so much pressure, the incentive for executives to identify those who add genuine value to a bank has rocketed. A few banks already try to adjust, when calculating bonuses, for franchise value—the advantage derived by employees from the bank’s brand value, league-table positions and other institutional strengths. An industry veteran says that more managers of big banks will come to realise that they do not need to pay twice over for the same bit of business, first by building a global infrastructure and then by rewarding an investment banker. “They would get one in five calls for big projects anyway,” he says.
有些银行处事会变得更加精细。银行在成本及资金方面压力重重,由此,相对从前,银行主管现在真是想方设法地寻找增加银行真实价值之人才。少数银行在计算分红时已考虑特许权价值(franchise value)的因素。银行特许权价值即员工从银行的品牌价值、排名情况及其他制度优势中获得的利益。业界一名资深人士表示,大型银行的经理发现,他们不必为了同一笔生意花两次钱:先是建立全球性的基础设施,接着还要奖励投资银行家。“再怎么说,每五笔大项目投资要求中他们总能做成一笔。

Other ideas in the vanguard of designing pay structures include “S-curves”, which pay less below a certain threshold of profit so as not to reward employees for market conditions and franchise value, but also pay out less above a certain threshold, to discourage excessive risk-taking. These types of thinking are likely to become more prevalent.
薪酬结构设计理念的先驱还包括“S曲线法”(S-curves)。这种方法下,当利润低于某个下限的时候,薪酬就要减少,这样可以避免员工因市场环境和特许价值而获得报酬。当利润高于某个上限时,薪酬也要减少,从而阻止过渡冒险,这种思维方式很可能流行开来
Many of these changes are welcome, with two caveats. First, no system can be foolproof. Risk-adjusted measures of compensation work only if risk is being measured properly, for example, and the industry has proved how unsafe an assumption that is. And attempts to control pay in one area tend to inflate it in another. As bonuses fall, pressure on banks to increase basic pay is already rising. That pressure will grow as the industry recovers and competition for the best staff increases. “At some point in the next few years, the industry is going to have an absolutely stellar year,” says a pay consultant who predicts that firms with clawback policies will have to offer more in upfront pay to attract recruits. The second caveat is that some employees really are worth lots of money. Asked to defend levels of pay prior to the crisis, many in the industry would reach for the analogy of film or sport, two other industries where talented individuals are critical to success and are richly rewarded as a result. The trouble with this defence is that it was not just the big-name stars who got really rich in financial services; the extras did too. Lower profits and more sensitive pay structures will mean that most jobs are repriced across the industry but the best people will still be the subject of frenzied competition and will still command huge sums. That may be distasteful to many outsiders but if pay structures better reflect information about the risks such star bankers are taking and if their pay levels do not inflate the compensation of everyone around them, it ought to be defended.
许多类似的改变博得人们的欢迎,但也有两点值得注意。首先,不存在“傻瓜”体系。比方说,唯有在风险得到准确评估时,RAPM才可能发挥作用,但业界也已经证明,此类评估不甚安全。何况,想要控制收入的这方面,往往就带来另一面的增长。现在银行红利下降,银行方面面临日趋上涨的增加基本工资压力。接下来,随着行业复苏,人才竞争加强,这种压力还会增加。“银行业在未来某时间必将迎来辉煌的一年。”一名薪酬顾问如是说,他预测,对于采取预留一部分奖金,根据今后表现发放的企业而言,要想吸引人才,他们就得增加直接发放的数额。其次,此类员工可谓价值连城。要是问起危机前为防止人才外流银行为其设定的薪金水平,业界很多人都会将其和电影或体育业类比,这两个行业中,人才也是成功的关键,因此,他们也是获益颇丰。然而,业界的一个问题在于,在金融服务中口袋鼓鼓的不仅仅是名声在外的主角们,还包括其他配角。利润降低,薪资结构更趋敏感,在这情况下,行业内多数工作的薪资都将重定,但人才,依旧是激烈竞争的焦点,也就依然能享有高薪。对于很多局外人来说,这样的结果是在让人憎恶,但如果说,这样的薪资结构可以更好的反映这些人才所持风险,如果周围的人的薪资不会因为他们的而升高的话,那么,人们还是应该为其辩护的

The biggest upheavals in pay and in risk management will be in wholesale banking. The assumptions that underpin the way retail banks manage risks and pay have withstood the crisis better. There are still lessons to be learned, of course. One result, for example, will be that lenders demand more data on customers, leading borrowers to concentrate more of their business on particular institutions. But the basics of credit-risk management have been reinforced rather than overturned.
就薪资和风险管理最大的剧变应该在于批发银行(wholesale banking)18。零售银行在这两方面采用的理论在这次危急中发挥了更好的作用。当然,依然有些教训。比如说,一个结果就是贷方对顾客的资料要求更多,这样就到导致借方将其业务更集中在特定的机构中。但信用风险管理(credit-risk management)的基础不仅未被颠覆,反而得到了加强。

There is a problem with this picture, however. Retail banks may have less to change operationally (their funding profile is the obvious exception) yet they still got into a ton of trouble. The worst mistakes of this crisis were arguably made in relatively simple areas of retail and commercial banking—from the concentration of risk in the corporate-loan book of HBOS to Wachovia’s kamikaze acquisition of Golden West, a Californian lender stuffed full of mortgage-shaped grenades. Complexity is not much of an excuse here. For many banks, the crisis reflects a simpler tale of frenetic asset growth and the inevitable turn of the credit cycle.
然而,各种还存在些问题。零售银行在操作上并无太多可改变的空间(其资金投入状况是个明显的例外),然而,他们还是遇到了重重困难。据称,这次危机最大的错误源于零售银行及商业银行一些相对简单的领域:从哈利法克斯银行(HBOS)借贷账簿上体现的风险集中19,再到美联银行(Wachovia)“自杀性”收购怀抱着满满的“房产抵押相关的手榴弹”的加州借贷公司金西金融(Golden West)20。这里,复杂不能算做借口。对很多银行来说,这场危机反映的不过是一个简单的神话罢了:资产疯长以及不可避免的信贷周期转向(credit cycle)21。

And that raises a bigger management question—how institutions can resist the pressure to grow when a boom is in progress. Such pressure comes from all quarters: from shareholders who want growth, from analysts who want to see higher returns on equity, from staff who want bonuses, from managers who want to keep their jobs, and from politicians who want higher employment and tax takes. One way of getting around this is to operate in markets that offer high growth without requiring great risks. “We run a boring business model in exciting markets,” says Mr Sands of Standard Chartered, which is headquartered in London but operates in developing countries. “The problem was that others were running exciting business models in boring markets.”
这就出现了一个更大的管理问题:繁荣时期,机构怎能承受增长的压力呢?压力无处不在:持股人希望股价上升;分析师希望股本回报率增大;员工希冀分红,经理要保住饭碗;政客寻求就业率上升,税收增加。要想避免这个问题,一个方法就是在在高回报而无需高风险的市场经营。渣打银行的桑兹(Sands)说,“我们是在繁荣的市场中采用保守的商业模式。”尽管渣打的总部设于伦敦,但其经营却在发展中国家。“问题在于,别人实在萧条的市场中还采用激进的模式。”

Industry bosses agree that saying “no” to opportunity is one of their most important jobs and among their most difficult. Those who did sit out some of the boom were heartily criticised for doing so. Ed Clark, the boss of Canada’s TD, recalls the heat he got from analysts for exiting the structured-products business. Ulf Riese of Svenska Handelsbanken (see article) remembers the pressure that the bank resisted to join its peers in the Baltic lending boom. Mr Timmermans, the risk chief at ING, points to the problem of getting out of positions at the right time. “It is relatively easy to get discipline into the process of putting assets on to the books. The problem is when you have held them for two years and think it may be time to offload,” he says.
行业的老板也认为,对机会说“不”既是他们最重要的任务,又同时是最艰巨的工作。要是哪家银行真的错失良机,放过繁荣期,那么,它必然要遭受一番口诛笔伐。加拿大TD集团总裁爱德•克拉克(Ed Clark)还记得当时他舍弃结构性产品(structured-products)22业务时,分析师对他怒目相向的情景。而提到波罗的海借贷繁荣期时,瑞典商业银行(Svenska Handelsbanken, SHB)未参与一事,伍尔夫•里斯(Ulf Riese)对当时银行收到的压力也还是记忆犹新。ING风险主管迪莫斯曼指出,问题在于适时抽身。“在账目上增加资产,相对而言要克制自己还比较容易,难的是,持有该资产两年后,要自知,是时候抛售了。”

The governance gap治理缺口
The memory of this most painful of episodes should make it easier for bosses to shake their heads, at least for a few years. Private capital will be more patient and managers will be more focused on sustainable growth rather than short-term returns on equity. Wrong-headed assumptions about risk dispersion will be less easily made. But there is an increasing recognition that the governance of financial institutions needs to be reviewed carefully (the British authorities have already initiated just such an exercise).
至少在接下来几年内,想到这一系列痛苦的事件,银行家做此类决定时,也就容易说“不”了。私募资本更有耐心,经理也会更关注持续增长,而不仅仅是短期股份回报。而就风险分散(risk dispersion)23问题上一些顽固不化的假设今后也没那么容易提出了。但现在人们逐渐认识到,金融机构的治理需要认真审查一番(英国当局已经开始着手这项工作了)

One obvious area of scrutiny will be the quality and composition of bank boards, which were found sorely wanting in many cases. That does not mean that directors should take responsibility for risk management, a job for bank executives. “Directors do not design aeroplanes for Boeing or make the food for Taco Bell,” says Mr Dimon of JPMorgan Chase.
一个明显需要审查的地方在于银行董事会的质量和构成,在很多银行中,这些董事会水平非常低。这倒不是说懂事有责任进行风险管理,那是主管的责任。摩根大通的戴蒙(Dimon)类比道,“董事不会给波音公司设计飞机,也不会在塔可钟(Taco Bell)烹饪。”

But it does mean that they can do a better job of vetting key executive appointments—for example, the rise of Chuck Prince, a lawyer, to head Citigroup and of Andy Hornby, a youthful former retailer, to lead HBOS should have prompted more searching questions. It means dedicating more time to reviewing the business, which implies a limit to the number of directorships that board members hold. It means separating risk and audit committees. It ought to mean dividing the role of chairman and chief executive. And it means asking more robust questions around such things as “key person” risk, in which only a few employees really understand what is going on in a particular line of business.
但是,这却意味着,在主管的任命上,他们在审查方面却还可以做的更好,比如说,让律师查克•普林斯(Chuck Prince)升任花旗的首席执行官,再比如说,让初出茅庐,零售业出身的安迪•霍恩比(Andy Hornby)领导HBOS,这些任命本来引发更多的质疑的。这还意味着董事会应该多花点时间审视其经营状况,也即,经理层中的董事数量应当加以限制。这还表示着,风险和审计委员应当分离,也应表示,主席和CEO分离,也意味着,在一些问题上要多发出些强硬的质疑声,譬如在“关键人物”风险上就是如此,该风险来自于公司的某项业务只有极少数人真正了解。

Profound questions are also being asked about the right model of bank ownership. Some fondly remember the old days of private partnerships on Wall Street. But for banks that need lots of money to operate, that is not an option. “Capital is like heroin,” says an investment banker. “Once you go down the capital-intensive route, you cannot go back.” Others promote the merits of mutuals, banks that are owned by their customers. Tony Prestedge of Nationwide, a British building society that has come through the crisis relatively well so far, says that being unlisted, mutuals can avoid being obsessed with short-term growth targets and can live with periods of reduced profits. Then again, Nationwide has spent much of the crisis snapping up other mutuals that have got into trouble, so the model is not infallible.
关于银行所有权模式的问题上,人们也提出了一些重要的问题。有些人对于过去华尔街上的私人合作伙伴津津乐道,但对于需要大笔资金运转的银行来说,这可不是办法。某个投资银行家这么说,“资本就如同海洛因,只要踏上了资金密集型这条路,你就失去了退路。”还有人会赞颂共同银行(mutual)24的好处,这种银行属于顾客。全英房屋抵押贷款协会(Nationwide Building Society)就是一例,到目前为止它在危机中的表现相对不错,公司发展规划官托尼•普雷斯蒂奇(Tony Prestedge)认为,共同银行不会上市,也就避免了其为短期增长目标费心劳神,在收益减少的时期下,也能存活下去。然而,危机中该银行做的最多的就是抢购其他陷入困境的共同银行,由此可知,这种模式也不是真的无懈可击的。

With quality of management being both the best defence against bank failure and something that can change with the appointment of a new chief executive or a rush of empire-building madness (step forward the managers of Bank of America and Lloyds TSB), regulators are likely to address the problem of governance in two different ways. The first will be to cushion the impact of those bank failures that do occur by creating better resolution regimes for large institutions and for non-banks. There are also proposals for banks to buy an option on capital via a kind of disaster-insurance scheme, paying out premiums to long-term investors in return for dollops of equity when crisis strikes.
现在,管理质量已成防止银行破产最好的防御措施,而且,新任的管理人员或者内部的权力的疯狂争夺(就像美国银行和劳埃德TSB的经理所作一般)都可能使其发生改变,那么,监管部门就可能用两种不同的方法来处理管理问题。首先,就要通过向大型机构及非银行机构提供更好的决议制度以减少确实发生的银行破产带来的影响。也有建议银行通过某种灾难险计划购买资本期权的,这种方法下,保费实际交给长期投资者,危机来临时,这些投资者则买入小部分股份。

The second direction of policy will be to intervene more forcefully to prevent failures in the first place, stepping in whenever asset growth accelerates, demanding a greater say in board appointments and vetoing dodgy acquisitions on the grounds of financial stability as well as competition concerns. More daring voices are even suggesting that there may be a case for an official presence at board meetings. There is at least time to get all of these things right. It will be a long time until anyone has to worry about the next bubble.
政策的第二种方向则在于,政府更有力地干预,从金融稳定和竞争两方面考虑,从源头开始防止破产,只要资产增长加快,就马上就行干预,要求在董事任免上更有发言权,否决风险太大的收购。还有些大胆的呼声甚至要求开董事会时应当政府有官员在场。至少我们还有时间把这一切安排妥当。下次泡沫还要很久才会到来。

1.   可伦坡:美国电影集《神探可伦坡》中的男主角,办起案来最特别的就是会缠着证人或疑犯问个没完,问到人家头皮发麻,甚至不自觉地自曝线索或掉入陷阱:他的招牌台词就是:"Sir, one more question......"
2.   缺口分析:In business and economics, gap analysis is a business resource assessment tool enabling a company to compare its actual performance with its potential performance. At its core are two questions: "Where are we?" and "Where do we want to be?" If a company or organization is under-utilizing its current resources or is forgoing investment in capital or technology, then it may be producing or performing at a level below its potential.
3.  交易账户:定义有三部分组成
A)又称交易组合(TRADING PORTFOLIO),简单而言,就是指能够在有组织的金融市场上被迅速买卖且持有时间较短的资产、负债和衍生产品头寸,包括债券、股票、外汇、某些商品以及与这些头寸相关联的衍生产品,其目的是为了获得短期收益。
B)针对交易账户,新巴塞尔协议规定:交易账户包括以交易为目的或以规避交易账户其它项目的风险为目的而持有的金融工具和商品的头寸。
C)符合进入交易账户计算资本要求的金融工具必须在交易方面不包含任何限制性条款,或者能够被完全套期保值而规避风险。
4.  风险偏好(risk appetite):风险偏好就是人对风险的态度,是对一项风险事件的容忍程度,一般分为风险喜好者/风险中性者/风险厌恶者.
5.  风险敞口(risk exposure):指未加保护的风险。比如你的收入是日元,但你有一笔美元的借款要还,是没有做任何对冲的交易(比如远期外汇买卖或外汇调期什么的),你因此就有了一个日元对美元的汇率风险敞口。
6.  风险概况(risk profile):个人或企业面对的风险大小。
7.  VAR法:VAR(Value at Risk)按字面解释就是“在险价值”,其含义指:在市场正常波动下,某一金融资产或证券组合的最大可能损失。更为确切的是指,在一定概率水平(置信度)下,某一金融资产或证券组合价值在未来特定时期内的最大可能损失。用公式表示为:
  Prob(△Ρ
  △Ρ表示:某一金融资产在一定持有期△t的价值损失额。
  VAR表示:给定置信水平α下的在险价值,即可能的损失上限。
  α为:给定的置信水平。
8.  溢出效应:Spillover effects are externalities of economic activity or processes upon those who are not directly involved in it.
9.  stress test: 压力测试,银行需要按照监管机构要求,分析银行在一般经济环境(baseline scenario)、及恶劣经济环境(adverse scenario)下,今、明两年的财政健康状况,以判断银行应付严峻金融环境的能力。
10.  basis risk:基差风险,是指保值工具与被保值商品之间价格波动不同步所带来的风险。
11.  credit-default swap信用违约互换:是国外债券市场中最常见的信用衍生产品。在信用违约互换交易中,违约互换购买者将定期向违约互换出售者支付一定费用(称为信用违约互换点差),而一旦出现信用类事件(主要指债券主体无法偿付),违约互换购买者将有权利将债券以面值递送给违约互换出售者,从而有效规避信用风险。
12.  自去年年底开始,针对价值33万亿美元的信用违约掉期市场,美联储就在寻求成为其中票据交换部门的主要监管方。
13.  交易对手风险(counterparty risk)合约对方不履行合约责任的风险
14.  打包出售(package):未找到相应的定义,我自己简单说,可能会有些漏洞。金融金钩打包出售的过程就是把原来不可交易的金融资产变成可交易的证券,比方说银行可以把其房地产抵押贷款打包出售。之前的美国房产危机一个原因就是这个。
15.  结合上下文考虑,可知这里讲的是风险调整绩效度量方法RAPM,RAPM为同时考虑风险及报酬两方面的绩效评估方法,其观念在经过量化之后即可成为资本分配的工具,因此很多金融机构为有效分配资本及增加其营运的效益,即纷纷开始实行使用RAPM。以金融机构的角度而言,获利主要来源是依靠风险的承担,所以金融机构运用资本以创造获利的同时,也面临着亏损的风险,这意味着绩效评估指标必须加入风险因素的考虑,才能正确反应经营绩效的优劣。简单而言,RAPM=利润/经济资本(economic capital)(经济资本:券商为维持永续经营所必须提供的现金储备)
16.   财政年度(financial year)又称预算年度,国家预算的有效起止期限,通常为1年。但起始日期随各国而异。
17.   特许权价值(franchise value,FV)银行业凭借其经营的特许资格地位获得的一部分超额利润。特许权的价值就等于银行在未来持续从事业务经营所得到的超额利润的现值。在投资领域,FV可以理解为某品牌的受欢迎程度,因此在后文翻译时加上“银行的”三个字
18.   《英汉国际金融大词典》对批发银行(Wholesale Banking)的解释为:“批发银行业务是指银行之间巨额款项的借入与贷出,区别于银行与其顾客之间以传统方式构成的零售银行业。”
19.   这件事之前TE有报道过,见http://bbs.ecocn.org/archiver/tid-17557.html
20.   2006年(房市繁荣期),美联收购全美第二大抵押贷款银行金西金融,当时这笔收购花掉了美联银行250亿美元,主要为现金,结果后来的次贷危机让主营抵押贷款的金西金融亏得一塌糊涂,也让美联银行饱受折磨。
21.   credit cycle这个词在国际投资中翻成“信用循环”,指从客户发出订单开始到偿付债款的过程,说实话我都不清楚这个“信用循环”到底怎么翻出来的,完全不着边的说。这里的credit cycle,指的是The credit cycle is the expansion and contraction of access to credit. 因此这里我翻成了“信贷周期”
22.   结构性产品(structured-products),是固定收益产品(Fixed Income Instruments)的一个特殊种类。它将定息的票据和远期、期权、掉期等衍生工具合二为一,增强产品收益或将投资者对未来市场走势的预期产品化。
23.   是指增加承受风险的单位以减轻总体风险的压力,从而使项目管理者减少风险损失。
24.   维基里面有类似的解释,A mutual, mutual organization, or mutual society is an organization (which is often, but not always, a company or business) based on the principle of mutuality. Unlike a true cooperative, members usually do not contribute to the capital of the company by direct investment, but derive their right to profits and votes through their customer relationship不过这种说法现在还不肯定,我在微软百科里面查了下,并没有提到这种银行,但是mutual company是存在的,虽然里面也没有详细说明company owned by clients: a company owned by its clients, e.g. an insurance company owned by its policyholders, who receive profits in the form of bonuses instead of in share dividends,根据这两份资料我暂时采取了“共同银行”的翻法,因为目前我真的没有遇到这个词,所以还是要等我找清楚相关的资料再定夺。
25.   Proprietary trading is a term used in investment banking to describe when the firm's traders actively trade stocks, bonds, options, commodities, derivatives or other financial instruments with its own money as opposed to its customers' money, so as to make a profit for itself.
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发表于 2010-4-28 18:40 | 显示全部楼层
汗  我译注的格式怎么这样  算了 明天再弄了  现在头是晕的
大嘴你来拍砖吧  不过这篇我还没校  错误肯定不少
下次再也不挑这么可怕的文章了  整整用了一个月   虽然中途有偷懒……
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发表于 2010-4-28 19:20 | 显示全部楼层
汗  我译注的格式怎么这样  算了 明天再弄了  现在头是晕的
大嘴你来拍砖吧  不过这篇我还没校  错误肯定不少
下次再也不挑这么可怕的文章了  整整用了一个月   虽然中途有偷懒……

大嘴这两天比较忙,忙完后一定来插嘴。

小哀的大作营养大大滴,偶是绝对不会放过滴!
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发表于 2010-4-28 20:00 | 显示全部楼层
我晚上一定看这篇文章。
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发表于 2010-4-28 21:20 | 显示全部楼层
1. The likes of Deutsche Bank, UBS and Credit Suisse have all unveiled strategies to cut their proprietary activities in illiquid markets and focus on high-volume “flow” businesses: for example, helping clients to manage exchange-rate and interest-rate risk. That means leaving some moneymaking opportunities on the table, a most unbubble-like thing to do. “We could have held on to certain assets and made money now but we cannot have this kind of risk irrespective of future potential,” says Josef Ackermann, the boss of Deutsche Bank.
而德意志银行、瑞士联合银行、瑞士信贷银行之属,业已采取若干策略,减少其用自己专有资金在非流动市场的投机活动,关注大额“流动”交易,例如,替顾客管理汇率、利率风险。那也就意味着,要放弃某些赚钱的机会,这样产生泡沫的几率最小。德意志银行行长约瑟夫•阿克曼(Josef Ackermann)表示“我们现在当然可以继续经营某些资产,以此获利,但我们也不能无视未来发展,走这步险棋。

That means leaving some moneymaking opportunities on the table, a most unbubble-like thing to do.
这里的LEAVE是否理解有误?你意译成“放弃”。
我认为恰好相反呢。
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发表于 2010-4-28 22:00 | 显示全部楼层
2. A game of pay sense薪资博弈
The bonus/malus structure introduced by UBS in 2008, whereby a cash portion of a bonus award is held back at the end of a financial year and reduced if targets are not met in subsequent years, will also become more common as institutions seek to track and reward the performance of senior managers over time.
2008年,UBS引入一套奖惩体系,规定现金红利只得在一个财政年度(financial year)16最末发放,倘若来年既定标准未达,红利就将减少。随着各机构在追踪、奖励高级经理绩效方面投入精力,它们必将效仿UBS的做法。

这里的HOLD BACK是否指: 现金红利到年底也不发放?
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发表于 2010-4-28 22:40 | 显示全部楼层
晕  居然有人把《钢之炼金术师》中那么恐怖的大嘴当头像的 呵呵~

啊——?

这下俺的自信心大受打击:L

窃以为这头像虽算不上什么英俊潇洒,但还是和蔼可亲的,怎么有人会用“恐怖”来形容:Q
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发表于 2010-4-28 23:20 | 显示全部楼层
大嘴这头像瞒可爱的。
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发表于 2010-4-29 00:00 | 显示全部楼层
好长好难的文章。。。楼主辛苦了!
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