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[2008.1.18]Asset-backed insecurity资产背后的不安全

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发表于 2010-3-17 23:21 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Sovereign-wealth funds
主权财富基金
Asset-backed insecurity
资产背后的不安全


Jan 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Wall Street, the flagship of capitalism, has been bailed out by state-backed investors from emerging economies. That has people worried—for good reasons and bad
资本主义的旗舰,华尔街正被来自新兴国家的政府背景的投资者救出困境。这让人民忧虑——有的理由充足,有的理由多虑了



IN REYKJAVIK almost two years ago the Norwegians were throwing their weight around and the locals were furious. Having spotted that an Arctic boom was about to end, a government-owned fund from Oslo must have thought it had found an easy way to make money in a market it knew well. It began to sell short the bonds of Iceland's over-stretched banks. Only common sense, you might argue.
大约在2年之前,在Reykjavik(冰岛首都),挪威人正四处抛售他们的权重资产并激怒了当地人。因为预计到北冰洋地区的经济繁荣即将结束,来自奥斯陆的一个由政府所有的基金当时一定认为在熟知的市场上操作是比较容易的赚钱方式。它开始卖空冰岛扩张过度的银行的债券。你也许会觉得,这只是投资学常识而已。


Halldor Asgrimsson, then Iceland's prime minister, did not see things quite like that. Why was the Norwegian state investing hundreds of millions of dollars to undermine Iceland's economy? Had not both countries signed a Nordic mutual-defence pact against financial destabilisation? “We must protest against this action,” he told Morgunbladid, a newspaper.
而当时冰岛的首相,Halldor Asgrimsson却完全不这么想。为什么挪威政府投资上亿美元来腐蚀冰岛的经济?两国不是已经签订了北欧共同防御条约以抵抗金融动荡么?“我们必须抗议这种行为”,他告诉报纸Morgunbaldid。




On Wall Street in the past few weeks, the sums have been bigger and the actions more benign—at least so far. This week Merrill Lynch and Citigroup became the latest to get the sovereign-wealth treatment, picking up a further $6.6 billion and $14.5 billion respectively, much of it from governments in Asia and the Middle East (see article). Sapped by the subprime crisis, rich-world financial-services groups have been administered nearly $69 billion-worth of infusions from the savings of the developing world in the past ten months, according to Morgan Stanley.
在华尔街过去的数周里,类似的交易也在发生,数目更大而且正面效应也更大——起码目前如此。本周最新获得主权财富优待的是美林和花旗,各自继续收到了66亿美元和145亿美元,其中大部分都来自亚洲和中东的政府。引自摩根斯坦利的观点,由于在次级债危机中受损,在过去的十个月内,富裕世界的金融服务集团从发展中世界的储蓄中设法得到了近690亿美元的援助注入。




Norse raiders one year and white knights the next, sovereign-wealth funds are as hard to grasp as shadows. In principle everyone welcomes foreign investment. But when the money belongs to other governments, people—especially politicians—are not always so sure. America's Congress has uttered barely a squeak as Wall Street's titans have taken foreign cash. But when credit was loose it was alarmed at the state-backed acquisitions of oil companies and ports.
一年前是北欧强盗,一年后又是白骑士(译注:指向面对独立方恶意收购的公司提出善意收购建议的公司),主权财富基金的形态和阴影一样难以把握。原则上,每个人都欢迎外国投资。但当资金来源于他国政府时,人民——通常都是政治家——就不会永远乐意了。美国国会在听说华尔街的泰坦们已经接受了外国现金后仅仅嘟囔了几声。不过在信贷宽松的时候,国会对有政府背景的收购石油公司和港口的交易是非常警觉的。








Some funds, such as Norway's, behave as capitalists bent on making as much money as they can. Others may have “strategic” goals—to nurture national champions, say, or to galvanise regional development. Sovereign-wealth funds are a way to help recycle emerging-market surpluses. And yet suspicion about their motives could make their money much less welcome: rather than accepting investment from sovereign-wealth funds, countries could turn to financial protectionism.
一些基金,比如挪威的,表现得像一个资本家,以赚取最大化的利润为目的。其他的则可能有“战略”目标——以培养国家的守卫者,或者说,促进地区发展。主权财富基金是一个有助于循环利用新兴市场顺差的途径。但针对它们动机的怀疑使这笔钱远没有想象中的受欢迎:许多国家宁愿转向金融保护主义,也不愿接受主权基金的投资。




You can see why a call from Canada's Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund may strike you differently from an offer by Venezuela's Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilisation. The question of what to do with other governments' money is becoming more urgent by the month. The 29 sovereign-wealth funds monitored by Stephen Jen, an economist at Morgan Stanley who has followed them closely, are now worth about $2.9 trillion (see table).
你可以发现,但来自于加拿大Alberta Heritage 储蓄信托基金和来自于委内瑞拉的稳定宏观经济投资基金的出价会给你完全不同的感觉。到了这个月,如何应对其他政府资金的问题变得更加急切了。根据近距离追踪29家主权财富基金的摩根斯坦利经济学家Stephen Jen的监测,这些基金的总价值接近2.9万亿美元。




His list contains a wide range of funds. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, of the United Arab Emirates, worth $875 billion, is biggest. But the table also includes the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which last year was sent into the world with $200 billion in its back pocket; and Alaska's $38 billion Permanent Fund, based on the state's mineral wealth.
他的单子里包含了一系列范围非常广泛的基金。来自阿联酋的Abu Dhabi Investment Authority是最大的,价值8750亿美元。桌子上还包括了中国投资公司(CIC),它去年时成立,背带里装着2000亿美元;还有阿拉斯加的380亿美元的永久基金,它是以政府的矿产财富为基础。




Although sovereign-wealth funds make up only 2% of the world's $165 trillion-worth of traded securities, they have a lot of firepower: more equity than private equity and more funds than hedge funds (see chart 1). In a paper for RGE Monitor, a research firm, Brad Setser and Rachel Ziemba conclude that the Gulf rivals China as a “new financial superpower”.
尽管主权财富基金在世界上价值165万亿美元的可交易债券中仅占2%,它们的火力可非常生猛:它比私募股权要多,比对冲基金要大。研究公司RGE Monitor的一篇论文中,Brad Setser和Rachel Ziemba的结论是海湾和中国是“新的金融超级强国”。



Moreover, sovereign wealth is growing fast. Mr Setser and Ms Ziemba reckon that the Gulf's big funds could gain another $300 billion to manage this year alone. If you combine that with Asia's surpluses and the marvels of compound interest, you soon get to some large numbers. Simon Johnson, the IMF's chief economist, thinks sovereign-wealth funds will be worth $10 trillion by 2012. Mr Jen has pencilled in $12 trillion for 2015. But even at that rate of growth, the funds will probably still account for less than 3% of global traded securities.
而且,主权财富正在快速增长。Setser先生和Ziemba女士计算认为海湾的大型基金今年一年就可能扩大3000亿美元的额度。如果你把它和亚洲的顺差和美妙的复利率结合起来,你很快就能得到一个巨大的数字。IMF的首席经济学家,Simon Johnson认为主权财富基金在2012年将价值10万亿美元。Jen先生则认为2015年时是12万亿美元。不过,即使按照如此的增长速率,这些基金可能在那时的全球可交易证券中依旧只占不到3%。


Golden guano
黄金做的鸟粪
The idea that governments should put something aside for a rainy day has a long and respectable history. Kiribati, a Pacific island country that mined guano for fertiliser, set up the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund in 1956. Today the guano is long gone, but the pile of money remains. If it manages a yield of 10% a year, the $400m fund stands to boost the islands' GDP by a sixth. Many oil producers now run similar schemes for similar reasons. Today's windfall is too big to spend in one go at home without waste and inflation. It is wiser to save for times when oil prices are low or for the generations who will come after the oil runs out.
认为政府在雨天应该储存一些东西的观点,在很长的历史中被人接受。太平洋岛国Kiribati开采海鸟粪作为肥料,并在1956年建立了Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund。今年,海鸟粪已经消失了,但资金却留了下来。如果它可以得到1年10%的收益,价值4亿美元的基金可以促进GDP增长1/6。许多石油生产商现在出于类似的原因在经营类似的计划。今天的横财不可能在家里在不产生浪费和通货膨胀的条件下一次花完。明智的行为是存下来以应对油价下跌的时期,或留给石油耗尽后的后代人。







In addition, returns on a portfolio of assets are likely to be higher than on a single commodity. Chart 2 shows, for instance, by how much equities outdid oil between 1985 and 2007. Better for an exporter to sell as much oil as it can today and invest the proceeds, than to leave the stuff in the ground in the hope of spreading production over the decades. The recent run-up in the price of oil and other commodities only adds to the attraction of producing now while the going is good.
而且,资产组合的回报很可能要高于一个单一的消费品。比如,图表二显示,在1985年至2007年之间股票是多么的优越于石油。所以对出口商而言,在今天尽可能多的卖出时候并用收益投资,要优于把它留在地里面然后期望能够增加十年后的产量。当前石油和其他消费品价格的增涨,仅仅是在趋势还不错的时候增加当前生产的诱惑力。




Commodities are not the only source of sovereign wealth. Many Asian emerging markets have been running current-account surpluses at the same time as they have been managing their exchange rates. As they have mopped up dollars, using government bonds, they have accumulated reserves. At first these went into safe, liquid assets like American Treasury bonds—the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was still a recent memory and many countries were keen to amass reserves. But economies like China, South Korea and Taiwan now have more reserves than they need to defend themselves against shocks. Their governments understandably want to earn a higher return than Treasury bonds will pay, so they create a fund to manage their assets.
消费品也不是主权财富基金的唯一来源。许多亚洲新兴市场在操纵外汇汇率的同时获得了经常账目的顺差。他们发行政府债券以抹去美元,这样就积累下了外汇储备。一开始,这笔钱用在了安全、流动性强的资产比如美国国债——1997-98年的亚洲金融危机还历历在目,许多国家都渴望积聚外汇储备。但像中国、南韩和台湾等这样的国家,现在的储备已经超过了他们为对抗冲击所需要的。可以理解,它们的政府一定希望能获得比国债更高的回报率,因而它们创立了基金以管理他们的资产。
Like other sovereign funds, these tend to invest government money, often abroad and for long periods, in relatively risky assets. Yet the funds do not only come from a wide array of countries; they also have a variety of motives. Norway sees its stash as a pension fund. Russia and Iran have stabilisation funds, to counter the volatility of energy prices. China and South Korea want returns—and possibly access to markets, ideas and technology.
和其他主权基金一样,这些基金倾向于将政府资金投资到海外的长期且风险相对有限的资产上。目前这些基金来源的国家比较有限;他们的动机也各不一样。挪威把这笔钱用作养老基金。俄罗斯和伊朗是则稳定型基金,用来对抗能源价格波动性。中国和南韩则希望得到回报,也可能是想获取市场,理念和技术。
Things that go bump
引起争议的事情
Whatever their motives, sovereign-wealth funds are sure to influence prices and markets. Mr Jen expects them to cast their money broadly across industries and economies. Hence they will buy assets priced in Japanese yen and emerging-market currencies; their governments' foreign-exchange reserves tend to be concentrated in dollars and euros. Mr Jen reckons about 40% of the funds' assets will be in dollars, compared with 60% of their countries' reserves. By contrast, he thinks a fifth of the funds' assets will be in yen, against just 2% of reserves.
不管他们的动机如何,主权财富基金无疑能影响价格和市场。Jen先生期望他们把资金广泛地投资到各行业和国家中。今后基金购买的资产将以日元和新兴市场的货币为主结算;而它们政府的外汇储备倾向于集中在美元和欧元。Jen先生认为40%的基金资产都将是美元,对应美元占他们国家的外汇储备的60%。形成对比的是,他认为1/5的基金资产将是日元,而日元仅占外汇储备的2%。




As they spread their money around the world, sovereign-wealth funds will usually be greeted with open arms. Often, however, they will be treated with suspicion. Already, even as private-equity and hedge funds have retreated in the face of the credit crunch, they are being set up as the next villains of international finance.
随着它们把资金扩散到全世界,主权财富基金通常将贪婪地张开双臂。然而,它们却经常面临着不信任的环境。甚至随着私募股权和对冲基金在信贷崩溃前都已经撤退,它们的建立已经被当作国际金融界的下一个反面角色。




For some, the nub of it is that governments are less interested in money than in power. Kevin Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute illustrates the worries by imagining that China bought Citigroup. What if America sought to take sides in a conflict with Taiwan and China and then threatened to shut the bank down? Or, less apocalyptically, suppose that Venezuela bought Alcoa and set about closing its aluminium smelters in the United States in order to move production to Latin America, as part of a strategy for development.
对一些人而言,最核心的问题是政府对权力的兴趣要大于财富。美国企业机构的Kevin Hassett通过遐想中国收购了花旗来展示了这种忧虑。如果美国被威胁关闭花旗银行,当台湾和中国爆发冲突后他们会站在哪一边呢?或者,换个没那么大破坏性的,假如委内瑞拉收购了Alcoa,作为发展战略的一部分,它可能会决定关闭在美国的铝熔炉以将生产转移到拉丁美洲。




Others are worried for precisely the opposite reason: that the funds are interested chiefly in making money. This would not matter much but for the sheer size that some funds have now attained. They are big enough to shift markets—as the Norwegians and Icelanders discovered. The 21st century's successors to George Soros, who made a killing from sterling's ejection from the European exchange-rate mechanism in 1992, may not be a private fund-manager but the agents of foreign powers.
而另一些人则完全是出于相反的原因:担心这些基金的主要兴趣是赚钱。如果基金所达到的规模较小,这不是一个大问题。但主权基金却大得足以操纵市场了——就像挪威人和冰岛人所发现的。乔治.索罗斯在1992年英镑被逐出欧洲自动汇率系统时大赚一笔,但他在21世纪的继承人不太可能是一位私募基金经理,而更可能是某海外力量的代理人。




Yet, for all these imagined fears, it is hard to find examples of sovereign-wealth funds abusing their power. As with private-equity groups and hedge funds, the anxieties owe less to reality than to a mix of secrecy and suspicion. With a few exceptions, like Norway, which opts for disclosure, you cannot tell what a sovereign-wealth fund's objectives are, precisely how much money it manages and where it has made its investments. Already the funds use the full range of investment options, including hedge funds and private equity, which further covers their tracks.
尽管有这些假想的恐惧,但目前还很难发现主权财富基金滥用权力的例子。相对于私募股权集团和对冲基金的焦虑而言,其现实性还是要小于隐秘和不信任的混合体。除了一些特例,比如挪威选择公开信息外,你不可能知道一个主权财富基金的目的是什么,以及它操控的资金的精确数目和它的投资方向。而且这类基金已经采用了全部的投资选择,包括对冲基金和私募股权,这样又进一步掩盖了它的痕迹。




Investing abroad for profit is hard enough: recall Japanese companies' bubble-era forays into Hollywood and New York. Running a business non-commercially is a recipe for huge losses rather than world domination: look at the history of France's Crédit Lyonnais or China's state-owned banks. Criticism of sovereign funds' investments has by no means all come from recipient countries. China's CIC seemed to have scored when it paid $3 billion for a stake in Blackstone, a private-equity group that listed its shares. Today its holding is worth closer to $2 billion and CIC has been lambasted in Beijing.
投资国外以获得利润是很困难的事情:回顾一下日本公司在泡沫时代侵入纽约和好莱坞的情景。不以商业利润目的,迎来的多半是巨额亏损而不会是统治世界:可以研究一下法国的里昂信贷和中国国有银行的历史。对主权财富基金的批评也不光是来自被投资的国家。中国投资公司出资30亿美元购买上市的私募股权集团——黑石的股份的时候,似乎是赢得了胜利。今天它持有的股份仅接近20亿美元,中投公司在国内为此饱受诟病。




All this raises the question of who has the upper hand on Wall Street now. Are the investment banks selling cheaply, out of necessity? Or have the sovereign investors been seduced by Wall Street hustlers?
所有这些都指向了一个问题,现在究竟是谁控制了华尔街。投资银行是否完全不必要贱价出售?或者主权投资者被华尔街的妓女给诱惑了?




There are benefits on both sides, but maybe the American side is happier. The investment banks are getting much-needed capital. Most likely, their new shareholders will want to stay around for a while—or will find it hard to sell a lot of shares quickly if they do not. And via the new investors, Wall Street may enjoy better access to emerging markets. Certainly, American politicians have been glad enough to see emerging-market governments bail out their banking system—with funds that, Mr Setser impishly points out, have been flowing faster than IMF aid ever did to emerging markets in crisis.
双方都会受益,但可能美国方面收益更多。投资银行现在非常需要资本。最可能的是,他们新的股东会观望一段时间——即使他们不观望,也很难在短时间内让股票出手。而经由新的投资者,华尔街可能会更便捷的进入新兴市场。毫无疑问,美国的政治家是乐于见到新兴市场的政府来拯救他们的银行系统——Setser顽皮的指出,这些基金流入的速度比IMF在新兴市场的危机时期的援助速度要快得多。




Keep out
禁止入内
Mutual admiration is not the rule. The first sovereign-wealth fund, the Kuwait Investment Office, created in 1953, ran into trouble in Britain two decades ago. In 1987 it bought more than 20% of British Petroleum, then recently privatised. The British government, headed by Margaret Thatcher, was in no mood to see so much of a national treasure owned by a foreign government—and an oil producer at that. Never mind the free market: the Kuwaitis had to sell more than half their stake.
互相赞美不是游戏的规则。科威特官方投资创立于1953年,是第一家主权财富基金,大约在20年前,它在英国的经营遇到了麻烦。在1987年,英国石油公司刚私有化的时候,它收购了其超过20%的股份。当时由撒切尔夫人领导的英国政府,很不满意看到国家的资产被一个外国政府所有——而且还是石油生产公司。自由市场的理念被抛到了脑后:科威特人被迫卖掉了超过1半的股份。




In the United States more recently, controversy has centred on state-owned companies rather than acquisitive sovereign-wealth funds. The efforts of China National Offshore Oil Corporation to buy Unocal, a Californian oil company, in June 2005 roused opposition. And when DP World, a port operator owned by the government of Dubai, sought to take over P&O's business in America, which included terminals in New York and New Jersey, a huge fuss broke out about Arab ownership of strategic infrastructure.
而在美国且离现实更近的情况是,争议主要集中在国有公司而非力图收购的主权财富基金。中国海洋石油总公司在2005年6月试图收购加利福尼亚石油公司Unocal时,引来了抗议声。而由迪拜政府所有的港务商——迪拜环球公司,设法接管P&O在美国的业务,这包括纽约和新泽西的交通终点站,一个巨大的关于阿拉伯人拥有战略性基础设施的忧虑爆发了。




Elsewhere, sovereign-wealth funds themselves have hit obstacles. In 2006 Singapore's Temasek sparked a row in Thailand by buying the family telecoms business of the then prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thais disliked Mr Thaksin's use of a loophole to avoid paying tax on the $2 billion his family raised in the sale. But they also objected to Temasek as a buyer, because it is owned by Singapore's government. Temasek has also had trouble in Indonesia, over stakes in two telecoms companies bought by firms majority-owned by Temasek. At the time, Indonesia, smarting from the Asian crisis, was grateful for Singapore's capital. Now that telecoms is thriving again, Temasek seems no longer as welcome. Wall Street's sovereign investors, take note.
在其他地方,主权基金也诸事不顺。2006年,新加坡的淡马锡公司在收购泰国当时的首相他信的家族电讯产业时,引燃了激烈的争论。泰国人对于他信家族利用漏洞以对出售所获得的20亿美元避税的行为非常厌恶。但他们同样反对淡马锡作为买家,因为它由新家坡政府所有。淡马锡在印尼也遇到了麻烦,两家印尼的电信公司被由淡马锡主要控股的公司收购。当时,印尼正为亚洲危机而劳神,因此非常感激新加坡的资本。现在电讯业又开始繁荣了,淡马锡看起来已经不再受欢迎。华尔街的主权投资者,把这记下来。




Such examples point to the greatest reason for concern about sovereign-wealth funds: although the risk that the funds may abuse companies and markets is theoretical, the danger of financial protectionism is all too real. The idea that secretive foreign governments are up to no good exerts a powerful hold on the collective imagination. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, have both issued warnings. A former American official, speaking on condition of anonymity, says that Washington is even now in a state of “high alert”. He thinks the public debate about sovereign-wealth funds is the prelude to action against them and that the “kindling is dry”.
这些例子指向了担心主权财富基金的最重要的原因:尽管有关这些基金搞乱公司和市场的风险仅仅是理论上的,但金融保护主义的危险却是异常现实。隐秘的外国政府不会带来好东西的观念牢牢的占据了公众的头脑之中。法国总统尼古拉斯.萨尔科夫和德国首相默克尔都发出了警告。一位前美国官员,在匿名的状态下表示,华盛顿现在甚至处在“高度警戒”的状态之中。他认为公众有关主权财富基金的讨论是日后实际反对行动的序幕,而且“干柴已经准备好了”。


A broad, politicised hostility to foreign direct investment would come at a high cost. Such investment spreads financial capital, know-how and technology. It helps the world economy adjust to imbalances and gives countries stakes in each other's prosperity. By contrast, as the dispute over DP World showed, conflicts over one investment can rapidly become generalised to others—either directly or through bodies like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which weighs up the implications of takeovers on national security. That spreads uncertainty, which could even spill over into the trade of goods and services. The European Union, for instance, now wants such a committee of its own.
针对外国直接投资的一个广泛的,政治性的敌意将会产生极高的成本。类似的投资传播了金融资本、技巧和科技。它有助于世界经济调整不平衡性并让国家之间分享各自的繁荣。反过来,正如迪拜环球的争论所展示的,在一个投资项目上的冲突很快就会应用到其他投资上——或者是直接的,或者是通过类似于美国的海外投资委员会的组织,他们在收购是否影响国家安全上占有很大的份量。它传播的不确定性,甚至还会溢出到商品和服务的贸易之中。比如,欧盟现在就希望自身拥有一个类似的委员会。




Even now, suspicion of sovereign-wealth funds comes at a price. The investments in Wall Street have helped to stabilise the banking system, making this an ideal moment for active shareholders to be crawling all over the banks, asking what went wrong in the credit crunch and how to prevent the next. Instead, the banks have taken on large, friendly, long-term shareholders who cannot easily kick up a fuss. If the new investors were to become disgruntled, they may find it costly to sell in a hurry. And most of the funds know that if they cause trouble, people in Washington will soon get to hear about it.
即是现在,对主权财富基金的疑虑也产生了成本。投资到华尔街的资金有助于稳定银行系统,对于活跃的股东们而言这是一个理想的时刻可以挖掘银行的每一个层面,以找出导致信贷崩溃的问题和去避免下一次危机的方法。换而言之,银行因此获得了大量友好的长期股东,他们不会轻易的被情绪左右。即使新的投资人变得很不满意,他们也会发现短期出售的损失是相当大的。而且,大多数基金心里也明白,如果他们不安分,华盛顿的政治家们会第一时间得到消息。




Sovereign guarantees
主权的承诺
Moreover, a scandal of one sort or another is almost inevitable. With thousands of investments by hundreds of fund managers wielding trillions of dollars, someone, somewhere is going to do something corrupt or foolish. That is why it makes sense to minimise the risk of conflict now.
此外,出现一两种丑闻将是难以避免的。成百的基金经理和上千的投资意向,挥舞几万亿美元,免不了其中有个人会在某个地方做些腐败或愚蠢的举动。而这正是当前有必要减小的潜在冲突的原因。




Last summer Clay Lowery, an American treasury official, proposed that the IMF work on a code of conduct for sovereign-wealth funds. It is devising a scheme to make them more transparent. Shedding light on their strategy and investments should ease suspicion. But transparency alone gets you only so far: it does not, for example, stop abuse or protectionism.
去年夏天,美国财政局官员Clay Lowery建议IMF设计一套主权财富基金的操作守则。该方案的设计是为了让主权基金更加透明化。只要光能够照到它们的战略和投资上,怀疑自然会消去。但仅仅是透明化是远远不够的:举例而言,它不能阻止滥用权力,也无法阻止保护主义。




Hence the importance of the OECD, which is looking at how host countries treat sovereign investors. It can draw on existing rules that are already widely accepted. Most countries, for example, limit who can own banks, because governments often guarantee deposits and because confidence in banks underpins the financial system. Similarly, most countries curb ownership of defence technology and utilities. You do not need a handbook of new restrictions. And you do not need to make sovereign-wealth funds a special case: instead, you have clear, predictable rules that apply to everyone.
因此彰显出OECD的重要性,它正在观察东道主国家是如何对待主权投资者。它可以采用广泛接受的现存的规则。比如说,大多数国家都限制银行所有人的身份,因为政府经常担保存款,也因为对银行的信心支撑着金融系统。出于类似的原因,大多数国家都会限制国防技术和设施的所有权。你不需要一本手册以了解新的限制方案。你也不需要把主权基金当作特例:换言之,你可以很清晰的预测到应用给所有人的规则。




The hope is that both host countries and sovereign-wealth funds see that their interest lies in building confidence. The hosts stand to benefit from the funds' capital. Meanwhile the funds are ruled by the politics of the places where they invest. You are sovereign only at home; abroad, someone else wields the power.
目前的希望在于东道主国家和主权财富基金都能认识到他们的利益都在于建设市场信心。东道主的受益来自基金的资本。同时,主权基金还要受到被投资方的政治法规约束。仅在家里,它才是“主权”,在国外,权力在别人手上。




That is one reason why the managers of sovereign-wealth funds say they want only minority stakes. It is also a reason for them to have modest ambitions. Joshua Aizenman and Reuven Glick, in a note for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, point out that with such large sums to invest the funds should chiefly aim to keep pace with an index, rather than to invest strategically. Sometimes that will make sense politically, too. The former official advises: “If you want to invest in the US, be boring...Try to look like everyone else.”
这是为什么主权基金经理表示他们只需要少数股权的原因。这也是他们野心有限的原因。Joshua Aizenman和Reuven Glick在写给圣.弗朗西斯科联邦储备银行的信中,指出,由于有如此大规模的资金,主权基金的主要目标应该和指数一致,不应该进行战略投资。这在政治上有时候也是讲得通的。前官员建议:“如果你想投资美国,会很枯燥。。。就照着其他人做吧。”




Sovereign-wealth funds are large and growing fast. Secretive and possibly manipulative, they are almost designed to raise suspicions. That is why the chief threat they pose is of financial protectionism. And it is why today's grand rescue on Wall Street is likely to lead to a backlash in Washington tomorrow.
主权财富基金很庞大而且成长快速。隐秘而且很可能被操纵,它们在设计上就足以引起人们的不信任。所以它们所引发的主要威胁是金融保护主义。也因此,今天发生在华尔街的大拯救行动可能在明天会成为华盛顿的大禁令。
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发表于 2010-3-17 23:21 | 显示全部楼层
这篇文章好长。终于看完了。顶楼主一个。
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