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[2009.02.12]America and Israel

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发表于 2010-3-18 01:44 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
America and Israel
美国和以色列

Will the relationship change? Yes it can
两国关系会改变吗?很有可能

Feb 12th 2009 | WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition

Israel and the Palestinians seem stuck in a poisonous morass, as Israeli voters shift to the right. President Barack Obama has a chance of hauling them out of it
当以色列选民转向右翼时,以色列和巴勒斯坦像陷入了有毒的沼泽。美国总统奥巴马有机会将他们拖出。



AT FIRST glance, the chances of peace between Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land look dimmer than ever. If Binyamin Netanyahu ends up as prime minister (see article), Israel’s voters will have elected a man who, on paper at least, is unwilling to let the Palestinians have anything more in the way of a state than a hollowed-out Swiss cheese of feebly linked cantons. He says the moderate Palestinians are too weak to control the West Bank and need to be strengthened, under Israeli supervision, before any more territory can be handed over to them.

乍看上去,在圣地的阿拉伯人和犹太人之间的和平机会比以往更加黯淡。如果本杰明?内塔尼亚胡最终成为以色列总理,以色列选民选出的这位领导人,至少从表面上看来,不会让巴勒斯坦人得到更多,除了一个像瑞士奶酪一样支离破碎的国家。内塔尼亚胡说,温和的巴勒斯坦人能力太弱而不能控制约旦河西岸,在向巴勒斯坦移交更多的土地前,他们的能力应在以色列的监督下得到加强。

Moreover, even if the centrist Tzipi Livni wins the day, with her support for talks leading to two states living peacefully side by side, the Palestinians are for the moment so sour and so divided that they have no government or leader strong enough to cut a deal and make it work. In any event, after Israel’s ferocious assault on the Gaza Strip in December and January, there is no certainty that the current ceasefire will hold with the Islamists of Hamas, which still rules that territory despite its pasting.

此外,即使中间派分子利夫尼以支持两国和平共处的和谈赢得了大选,巴勒斯坦目前也处于酸楚和分裂之中,因为他们没有一个强大的政府或领导人来达成和实施和平协议。无论如何,在以色列去年12月和今年一月对加沙进行凶猛的攻击后,已同伊斯兰运动组织哈马斯达成的停火协议还存在变数,虽然遭到了痛击,但哈马斯仍然统治着加沙。
     
Yet hope persists, in part because Barack Obama has a chance of making American policy more even-handed and more effective, after eight years mostly wasted by George Bush and, before that, another eight years in which Bill Clinton tried but failed, to bring the two sides together. More even-handed means more sympathetic to Palestinians. But it also means more security, in the long run, for Israel.

然后,希望还是有的。部分在于现任美国总统奥巴马有机会制定更公平有效的巴以政策,使双方握手言和。对此,小布什在8年执政期间无所作为。他之前的克林顿虽有尝试但也功败垂成。更加公正的立场意味着对巴勒斯坦人更多支持,从长远看来,也意味着对以色列更多的安全保障。

True, nothing spectacular is likely to happen for months. For one thing, an Israeli government could take weeks or more to emerge, and could then prove hobbled by religious and other clamps. For another, Mr Obama, who sees the American economy as his priority, has yet to acquire his own Middle East team, let alone policy, under the dual aegis of Hillary Clinton as his secretary of state and George Mitchell as his special envoy. Besides, not just the Palestinians but also the Arabs and the wider region are in diplomatic disarray.

准确地说,在几个月内不会发生惊人的事情。首先,以色列新政府组建要数周时间,然后可能还会受宗教和其他因素制约而不能完全施展拳脚。另外,在国务卿希拉里?克林顿和中东问题特使乔治?米切尔支持下,将恢复国内经济作为首要任务的美国总统奥巴马还要组建他的中东问题团队,更不要说政策了。此外,除巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯国家外,美国还同更大范围内的国家都处于外交混乱之中。



Many of those Americans urging Mr Obama to take a new approach towards Iran, for instance, admit that little of substance is likely to alter until after Iran’s presidential election in June, when the erratic Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may—or may not—be ousted (see article). Iran, by the by, still eggs Hamas on to make negotiations with Israel difficult if not impossible.

例如,即使在敦促奥巴马对伊朗采取新政策的美国人中,许多也承认不到六月份伊朗选举结束,反复无常的内贾德是否可能被赶下台情况明朗后,美国对伊朗政策不可能有实质性改变。顺便说一下,伊朗仍在支持哈马斯,在可能情况下,将使哈马斯同以色列之间的谈判更加困难。

Syria is more promising. Even Mr Netanyahu, if he succeeds in forming a government, is likely to respond favourably to American suggestions that he continue the efforts of his predecessor, Ehud Olmert of the Kadima party, led now by Ms Livni, to negotiate a deal with Syria, whereby Israel would give up the Golan Heights in return for a peace treaty similar to those already signed with Jordan and Egypt. Opening a “Syrian track” is widely considered, by the new policymakers in Washington, to be a good idea. But an Israeli deal with Syria alone is no substitute for negotiations over the nub of the matter: a direct deal between Israel and the Palestinians.

叙利亚问题更有希望解决。即使是内塔尼亚胡,如果他能继任组建新政府,也可能积极响应美国的建议,继续他的前任奥尔默特(由利夫尼现在领导的前进党员)的努力同叙利亚商谈,归还戈兰高地,得到类似已同约旦和埃及签署的那种和平条约。华盛顿新的决策者广泛认为,开通“叙利亚路线”是个好主意。但是,以色列只同叙利亚达成协议并不能取代对问题关键点的和谈,那就是巴以之间的直接协议。

Mr Obama faces three early tests. The first, and perhaps the easiest, is to spell out his vision of a Palestinian state. Its outlines are well known and have been more or less agreed by sensible Palestinians and Israelis, including those in power, for the past decade. Israel would return to the armistice line that existed before the 1967 war, with minor adjustments and territorial swaps of equal size and quality, and would probably keep the three biggest Jewish settlement blocks that bulge out from the 1967 line. Jerusalem would be tortuously but fastidiously divided, allowing each side to have its capital there, with international oversight of the holy places. Palestinians would be granted a symbolic right for their refugees to return on the understanding that only a small and carefully calculated proportion of them would actually do so. Palestine would be sovereign but demilitarised, with an international force, perhaps led by NATO, securing its borders, both along the Jordan valley and maybe between Gaza and Egypt. A road-and-rail link, internationally monitored, might well connect the 50km (30 miles) or so between Gaza and the West Bank.

奥巴马面临着三个早期考验。第一个,也可能是最容易的一个,就是阐明他对巴勒斯坦建国的构想。巴勒斯坦建国纲要众所周知,并且在过去10年内,已经或多或少地为明智的巴勒斯坦人和包括执政者在内的以色列人所认同。那就是,以色列军队撤回到1967年战争前的停火线,同时对土地按照大小和好坏进行微调和交换,沿着1967年停火线修建的三个最大犹太人定居点很可能保留。耶路撒冷将被认真地曲折分割,以使每一方在此都有自己的首都,国际社会则对城中的圣地进行监督。同时,巴勒斯坦将有一项象征性的权利,巴勒斯坦难民在经过精心计算数量的的基础上,小部分可以回归。巴勒斯坦将独立自主但要非军事化,由北约领导的国际部队将保证约旦河谷、加沙和埃及间的边境安全。由国际社会监督的50余公里公路铁路线,将连接加沙和约旦河西岸地区。

Mr Olmert himself recently announced, soon after his decision to leave office amid corruption allegations, his wholehearted adoption of the broad package described above. In particular, he mentioned a need to give back “all or nearly all” of the occupied territories and to let the Palestinians have their capital in Jerusalem, on its east side. The clear support of Mr Obama would bolster the region’s many moderates and put recalcitrant Israelis and Palestinians alike on the spot.

在因腐败指控辞去总理职务不久,奥尔默特宣称,他完全接受上述一揽子解决方案。值得一提的是,他提到必须向巴勒斯坦归还全部或接近全部被占领土,并让巴勒斯坦在耶路撒冷东部建立首都。奥巴马明确支持该方案将激励巴以温和人士,也会使以色列和巴勒斯坦顽固分子走到一起。

The president’s second big test, widely mooted, will be to warn the Israelis that further expansion of the Jewish settlements on the West Bank, either by extension of boundaries or “natural growth”, is totally unacceptable—and will have painful repercussions if it goes on. It is unlikely, in the short run, that an American president, even Mr Obama, would have the nerve to cut military or other aid to Israel in a hurry. The only president to have threatened to do so was George Bush senior, in 1991, when he said he would withhold guarantees on loans. Since then, every Israeli leader has continued to allow settlement expansion, in contravention of international law, without a serious American reaction.

奥巴马总统的第二个大考验曾引起广泛争论,这就是警告以色列人在约旦河西岸不要再扩大犹太人定居点,不管是通过延伸边境线还是“自然增长”的方式,完全不能接受。如果此举持续,还会导致痛苦的反击。在短期内,一个美国总统,即使是奥巴马还没有勇气匆忙停止对以色列的军事和其他援助。唯一一个发出这种威胁的美国总统是老布什,1991年,他曾说过要拒绝给予以色列贷款保证。从那以后,在没有美国强烈反应和违反国际法的情况下,每一个以色列领导人都继续放任犹太人定居点扩张

In a recent article in Newsweek one of Mr Bush’s advisers on Israel-Palestine, Aaron Miller, made a rueful confession:

在《新闻周刊》近期一片文章中,布什的以巴政策顾问Aaron Miller发了一个充满悔意的声明:

In 25 years of working on this issue for six secretaries of state, I can’t recall one meeting where we had a serious discussion with an Israeli prime minister about the damage that settlement activity—including land confiscation, bypass roads and housing demolitions—does to the peacemaking process. There is a need to impose some accountability. And this can only come from the president. But Obama should make it clear that America will not lend its auspices to a peacemaking process in which the actions of either side wilfully undermine the chances of an agreement America is trying to broker. No process at all would be better than a dishonest one that hurts America’s credibility.

我曾先后在六任国务卿领导下,为巴以问题工作了25年。我想不起曾同以色列总理开过一次会,以严肃讨论定居点活动,包括土地征用、加设道路和撤除(巴勒斯坦人)房屋,对和平进程所带来的损害。现在有必要对当事双方强加一些责任,而这只有总统能做到。但奥巴马应该清楚表明,如果一方的行为故意损害使美国失去正在调停的协议的签订机会,那么美国不会对这种和平进程提供庇护。
没有和谈进程比一个伤害美国公信力的不诚心的和谈进程更好

Cutting aid is not the only lever Mr Obama has for jolting Israel into acquiescence over the settlements. Louder verbal expressions of dismay than any of his predecessors have made would be one more. Letting Israel know that the United States cannot any longer be certain to veto finger-wagging resolutions at the United Nations would be another.

削减援助并非奥巴马使以色列默认和解协议的唯一手段,比他的前任更高调地表示失望是第二选择,让以色列知道美国不能再在联合国否决有争议的议案也是另一个选择。

Drawing in Hamas
拉拢哈马斯

But Mr Obama’s hardest test of diplomacy will be drawing Hamas, directly or indirectly, into negotiations. As things stand, Hamas remains excluded because it has refused to meet three laid-in-concrete conditions: a disavowal of terrorism; accepting Israel’s right to exist; and going along with previous agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the nationalist umbrella group to which Hamas does not belong, which would imply acceptance of a two-state solution. Mr Obama during his election campaign and Mrs Clinton since her appointment as secretary of state have reiterated those conditions. Yet a growing body of fixers trying to solve the Israel-Palestine problem, including many Americans in the Obama camp, now think Hamas must be involved, while at the same time knowing that Hamas is certain not to meet those three conditions unambiguously or straight away.

然后,奥巴马最大的外交考验在于能否直接或间接地将哈马斯拖上谈判桌。就目前看来,哈马斯被排除在和谈之外,因为它拒绝承认三个确认的前提条件:脱离恐怖主义、接受以色列生存权,赞成巴勒斯坦解放组织(巴勒斯坦起保护伞作用的民族主义集团)以前签订的协议(这些协议暗示接受两个国家的解决方案)。奥巴马在大选时重申了这些条件,希拉里在提名为国务卿后也做了这样的表示。
然而,不断增长的试图解决巴以问题的调停者(其中也有许多奥巴马阵营内人士)现在认为,哈马斯必须加入和谈进程,同时知道哈马斯一定不会马上就明确地答应上述三个条件。



On paper, Hamas rejects Israel’s existence outright. Its charter, which contains anti-Semitic slurs and slanders, seeks to establish sharia law on all the territory of mandated Palestine, between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean. It glories in martyrdom. Since 1993, and especially during the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) from 2001 to 2004, it has carried out more than 100 suicide attacks on Israeli civilians, killing at least 400. It has sanctioned the firing of rockets, though mostly home-made and rarely lethal, at Israeli towns across from Gaza. It reviles its secular rival, Fatah, for its supposed treachery in accepting the Jewish state and the principle of Palestine’s partition.

理论上,哈马斯完全排斥以色列的生存权。该组织的宪章中包含了许多反犹的侮辱和诽谤语言,表明了寻求在约旦河和地中海之间所有的托管巴勒斯坦领土上按照伊斯兰法律进行统治,也以殉道为荣。从1993开始,尤其是2001至2004第二次巴勒斯坦起义期间,该组织已针对以色列平民进行了100多次自杀式袭击,杀害了至少400人。并从加沙对以色列城镇发动火箭弹(虽然大多数为自造并且致命性不大)袭击。它痛斥它的世俗对手法塔赫背信弃义,因为它认定法塔赫接受犹太国家,并承认巴勒斯坦分割原则。

But Hamas is probably indispensable if there is to be a breakthrough towards negotiation. For one thing, it may well be the most popular Palestinian group (see table to the left). It won the last general election in the Palestinian territories fair and square, with nearly 44% of the votes to Fatah’s 41%, getting a big majority of seats in the Palestinian parliament. And it still controls Gaza, despite its recent pummelling by the Israelis and despite a blockade and economic sanctions that have lasted intermittently for more than three years. Hamas says it would stop firing rockets, at least for a period, if the blockade were lifted.

但是,要想和谈取得突破,哈马斯组织就不可或缺。首先,它可能是最受欢迎的巴勒斯坦团体(见表格),曾以近44%的选票击败赢得41%选票的法塔赫,公正地赢得了上届巴勒斯坦大选,在巴勒斯坦议会中拿到了大多数席位。并且,虽然最近遭受以色列持续打击和三年多间歇性的封锁和经济制裁,它仍然控制着加沙地带。哈马斯表示,如果解除对加沙的封锁,它将至少在一段时间内,停止火箭袭击。

In any event, Hamas is more pragmatic than its charter suggests. In conversations with various Western notables, including former President Jimmy Carter and a former head of the American Jewish Congress, Henry Siegman, and in articles in the Western press (in the Guardian, the Washington Post and elsewhere), its two most prominent leaders, Khaled Meshaal, its secretary-general, and Ismail Haniyeh, its prime minister, have edged towards meeting that trio of conditions.

无论如何,哈马斯表现得要比它的宪章要务实。在同各种西方名人(其中包括美国前总统卡特和美国犹太协会前主席)人交谈中,在西方媒体的文章(包括《卫报》、《华盛顿邮报》和其他媒体)中,两个最著名的哈马斯领导人——秘书长马沙尔和总理哈尼亚,都逐渐趋向答应上述三个条件。

They state that Hamas would accept Israel “as a reality” if it withdrew to the 1967 boundary and if the Palestinian people accepted the terms of a final deal in a referendum. Hamas would also agree to a hudna, a ceasefire plus a political engagement, which—depending on circumstances and on whom in Hamas you talk to—could be 18 months, ten years, or even 50.

他们声明,如果以色列撤回1967年的边境线,并且巴勒斯坦人民通过公决接受最终协议的条款,哈马斯将“作为一个现实”接受以色列。哈马斯也将答应在政治约定基础上停火。当然,那要取决当时的情况以及同哪个哈马斯人员谈判,这个过程可能需要18个月、10年甚至50年。

Plainly, differences rumble within in Hamas. Its leadership is scattered, with Mr Meshaal in Damascus, Mr Haniyeh in Gaza and nearly all those elected to parliament and resident in the West Bank now in Israeli prisons. Some of the religious zealots may well believe in the obnoxious charter. Others, including Messrs Meshaal and Haniyeh, try to brush it off and then, if pressed, dangle it as an item for negotiation, much as Fatah used the dropping of the PLO’s charter, which equally rejected Israel’s existence, as a bargaining tool.

显然,分歧在哈马斯内部也存在。哈马斯领导层散落四处,马沙尔流落在大马士革,哈尼亚住在加沙,几乎所有被选入议会住在约旦河西岸的哈马斯高层现在被囚禁在以色列监狱中。一些宗教狂热分子可能坚信令人厌恶的哈马斯宪章。另外一些,包括马沙尔和哈尼亚试图放弃宪章,可能在受压情况下,将它作为谈判的筹码。就像法塔赫使用同样拒绝以色列生存权的巴解组织宪章作为讨价还价的工具一样。



Most Palestinians who voted for Hamas also, judging by a raft of opinion polls, actually support the notion of two states. Hamas’s popularity is based not on its call for Israel’s annihilation, but on its reputation for honesty in contrast to Fatah’s for corruption, on its determination to fight against Israel and on Fatah’s failure, so far, to win a state by negotiation. Most Palestinians still want unity between Fatah and Hamas so that a broad government can prise a state out of Israel’s hands, on the West Bank and Gaza.

从一系列民意调查来看,大多数投票赞成哈马斯的巴勒斯坦人实际上也支持两个国家的观念。哈马斯的声望,并不是基于号召要消灭以色列,而来自于其诚信的名声和同以色列战斗的决心。而法塔赫因腐败以及通过和谈赢得一个国家的失败而失去人心。大多数巴勒斯坦人仍期望哈马斯和法塔赫团结起来,以组织一个代表广泛民意的政府,摆脱以色列的控制,在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个国家。

Nearly two years ago, at Mecca, the two groups did sign a short-lived unity accord. Hamas agreed, among other things, to “respect” previous PLO agreements, which implied an acceptance of Israel via a two-state solution, though the precise wording later got tangled up in angry semantics: did respect mean accept, and so on? In any event, a few months later, when Fatah was poised militarily to unseat Hamas from its control of Gaza, the Islamists—as they explain it—launched a pre-emptive coup, since when they have kept Fatah, often ruthlessly, out of power in the Strip.

大概两年前,哈马斯和法塔赫也曾签署了一个短命的统一协议。除其他条款外,哈马斯答应“尊重”巴解组织以前同以色列签订的协议,这些协议暗示通过两个国家的形式接受以色列。然而,精确的措辞却同令人发怒的语义学纠缠到一起,存在着是否“尊重”意味“接受”等问题。无论如何,数月后,当法塔赫试图以武力解除哈马斯对加沙的控制时,哈马斯如他们解释的那样,发动了一场先发制人的政变。从那以后,哈马斯就通过残酷的方式将法塔赫赶出了加沙。

There is little doubt that Mr Mitchell will seek to draw Hamas in. He learnt, during his successful peace-broking in Northern Ireland in 1995-98, that groups such as the Irish Republican Army could not be expected to meet preconditions, such as a definitive disavowal of violence, if an eventual peace was to be achieved. It would be astonishing if he did not apply similar logic—though necessarily, at this stage, in private—in dealing with Hamas. Britain’s Tony Blair, who as prime minister worked closely with Mr Mitchell for peace in Northern Ireland, may become more active as an international envoy for peace in Israel-Palestine. It is increasingly clear that no deal in that case will stick if only one half of the Palestinian movement is involved.

毋庸置疑,米切尔会试图拉拢哈马斯。通过1995—1998年在北爱尔兰的成功调停,米切尔清楚,如果想达成最终的和平,不可能指望爱尔兰共和军这类团体接受诸如放弃暴力等前提条件。如果他在私下与哈马斯打交道时,不运用必须的类似手段将令人吃惊。英国前首相布莱尔,在担任首相期间,曾与米切尔为北爱和平而紧密工作。作为国际和平大使,他可能在调停巴以问题中表现更为积极。如果在仅有巴勒斯坦运动一方参与和谈的情况下,没有协议会生效,这一点越来越明显。

From AIPAC to J Street
从“美国以色列公关委员会”到“J街道”

In mainstream American politics, especially Jewish-American circles, the idea of talking to Hamas has been virtually taboo. This is no longer true. After Mr Obama’s election, a group of senior bipartisan foreign-policy veterans handed a compelling letter, still unpublished, to the incoming president. Its signatories included Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, who headed the National Security Council in Mr Carter’s and George Bush senior’s White House; Lee Hamilton, a Democrat who for many years chaired the House committees on foreign affairs and intelligence; Sam Nunn, a Democrat who chaired the Senate’s armed services committee; Paul Volcker, a long-time chairman of the Federal Reserve; Mr Siegman; and James Wolfensohn, a former head of the World Bank who was more recently entrusted by the younger President Bush with reviving the Palestinian economy.

在主流美国政治中,尤其是在犹太裔美国人中,同哈马斯谈判一直是一个禁忌,但情况再也不同了。在奥巴马当选后,在外交政策方面有丰富经验的一些政客向当选总统递交了一封尚未发表的强制性信件。签名者包括Zbigniew、布热津斯基以及曾在卡特和老布什政府中领导过国家安全委员会的斯考克罗夫特;曾担任众议院外交与情报委员会主席多年的民主党人李?汉密尔顿;曾担任参议院军事委员会主席的Sam Nunn;曾长期担任美联储主席的Paul Volcker;还有Siegman和沃尔芬森,沃尔芬森为世界银行前行长,前不久被小布什指派为恢复巴勒斯坦经济官员。

The letter’s three key demands were that Mr Obama should appoint an even-handed special envoy with real clout (done); that he should spell out a clear vision for a Palestinian state (awaited); and that he should seek to draw Hamas into talks (not so easy). A key member of Mr Mitchell’s staff, Fred Hof, who previously co-drafted Mr Mitchell’s famous report on the state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2001, is close to the Scowcroft group.

信内有三个关键要求:一是奥巴马应当任命一位公平的有实际影响力的特使(该条已经实现),二是奥巴马应制定出清晰的巴勒斯坦建国方略(期待中),三是奥巴马应寻求将哈马斯拉到谈判桌上来(这一点不那么容易)。米切尔团队中一位关键成员Fred Hof,曾在2001年就巴以冲突状况同米切尔一起起草了一份著名报告,他同斯考克罗夫特集团走得很近。

Mr Mitchell’s appointment was warmly applauded by that group and greeted coolly by many in the old pro-Israeli lobbies, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). More to the point, though there have been other recent envoys to the Middle East, none has as much potential influence on the president as Mr Mitchell. General Jim Jones, too, Mr Obama’s new national security adviser, is a tough realist with recent experience in trying to improve security between Israel and Palestine. He is in hock to neither side.

对米切尔的任命受到了上述集团的热烈称赞,也受到了诸如美国以色列公关委员会等亲以色列游说势力中许多人的适度欢迎。更重要的是,虽然近来也有其他一些被派到中东的特使,但没有一个像米切尔一样对总统有这么大的潜在影响力。奥巴马的国家安全顾问Jim Jones将军,也是一位强硬的现实主义者,近来曾表示要改善巴以之间的安全状况。他不受巴以任何一方束缚。

No one is sure how Mrs Clinton, as secretary of state, will relate to Mr Mitchell—or to the Israelis and Palestinians. Since she became a senator for New York, she has ardently echoed more or less whatever AIPAC has said about Israel-Palestine. But some people recall how, when it was still controversial and her husband was president, Mrs Clinton called for a Palestinian state and even kissed Yasser Arafat’s wife after she had castigated Israel, a moment of horror in AIPAC’s eyes. Most probably, if Mrs Clinton sees a chance for a breakthrough to peace, she will go for it, whatever her previous constituents may think.

没有人确信国务卿希拉里怎样同米切尔或者巴以人民进行协调。自她成为纽约州参议员以来,她或多或少地热烈响应了美国以色列公关委员会的说法。但一些人也记得,虽然举动仍存在争议并且在他丈夫克林顿是美国总统情况下,希拉里是怎样地为巴勒斯坦国奔走呼号,甚至在谴责以色列后亲吻了阿拉法特夫人,这在美国以色列公关委员会眼中,无疑是恐怖一刻。很可能的情况是,如果希拉里看到了和平的突破时机,她将不会顾及她以前选民的想法,放过此次良机。

As for Mr Obama himself, no one is certain what he thinks; listening on such ticklish issues has been his forte. But those who have discussed Israel-Palestine with him reckon he is a lot more knowledgeable, even-handed and open-minded than his predecessor. He will not jump into the morass without careful preparation, but there is a fair chance, once Mr Mitchell has drawn up a plan, that the new president will engage quite soon.

至于奥巴马自己,谁也不能确定他的想法,倾听这类棘手的问题一直是他的强项。但是那些同他商讨过巴以问题的人认为他比前任更有见识,更公正,也更开放。在没有精心准备下,他不会跳进泥沼。但是,有一个公平的机会,一旦米切尔制定了一项计划,新总统会很快介入。



Most Americans still strongly back Israel in its determination to defend itself (see our table, left). Expressions of support for the Israelis during the Gaza war and an inclination to blame the Palestinians for starting it ran nearly four-to-one in the Israelis’ favour. Evangelical Christians, a large and powerful constituency, still revere Israel as ordained by God to hold sway over the Holy Land.

大多数美国人仍然强烈支持以色列包围自己的决定。在加沙战争期间,表达支持以色列以及倾向于指责巴勒斯坦发动战争的人数为4:1。福音派基督教徒,一个强大的选民团体,仍然坚信以色列是受上帝的指派对圣地进行统治。

But look harder at the polls and you see a striking shift in several sets of American attitudes, particularly among Democrats and liberal and younger Jews, which may give Mr Obama more room for manoeuvre. A big gap in support for Israel between Democrats and Republicans has opened up. Most striking is the emergence of a vigorous bunch called J Street, which declares itself “pro-Israel, pro-peace” but is far keener to see the Palestinian point of view. It is bluntly opposed to AIPAC and the array of groups that have backed Israel whatever the circumstances. In the new Obama era, the J Street people, together with a budding variety of other outfits, such as Americans for Peace Now, are on a roll, and are beginning to make at least some headway on Capitol Hill. Most strikingly, J Street has outspokenly called for Israel and its American friends to engage with Hamas.

但仔细看看民意调查,大家会看到在美国人几种态度中,特别是在共和党和自由派犹太青年中,出现了突出转变,这可能给奥巴马的中东调停更多空间。在民主党和共和党中,对以色列的支持出现了很大差距。最引人注目的是一个被称为“J 街道”的群体的出现,他们宣称自己“亲以色列,也亲和平”,但更希望听到巴勒斯坦人的观点。不管形势怎样,这些人遭到了美国以色列公关委员会和其他一些支持以色列的团体的反对。在新的奥巴马时代,“J 街道”人群,将和诸如“现在就要和平的美国人”等新生组织正不断涌现,并开始在国会中取得一些进展。最醒目的是,“J街道”已直接呼吁以色列和它的美国朋友同哈马斯打交道。

AIPAC is still very powerful. Many congressmen who have lauded J Street for what it is doing are wary of backing it openly, though it says more than 40 (of 435 in the House of Representatives) have publicly accepted its endorsement. But AIPAC is rattled. The point that J Street makes most forcefully is that, in the end, AIPAC has been bad for Israel’s security by invariably encouraging it to pursue policies that will not lead to peace with Palestinians.

美国以色列公关委员会的势力仍然强大。许多赞赏“J街道”所作所为的国会议员都小心翼翼,不敢公开支持它,虽然该组织说40位众议员已经公开接受它的立场。美国以色列公关委员会已被激怒。“J街道”最强调的一个观点是,归根结底,美国以色列公关委员会对以色列的安全有害无益,因为它总是鼓励以色列采取不会导致与巴勒斯坦达成和平的政策。

Mr Obama has many friends who passionately back the Israeli cause, not least his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel. The new man is also close to many young Jewish Democrats who sympathise with J Street’s thesis that “tough love” is what Israel needs if it is to survive, by squeezing it into giving the Palestinians a fair deal. Many knowledgeable gloomsters think a two-state solution is too late already. Today’s picture is bleak. But maybe there is a last-chance opening for a new president with a new team, new tactics, and a different set of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian backers, including Jewish ones, back home.

奥巴马有许多强烈支持以色列事业的朋友,这其中也包括他的参谋长联席会议主席Rahm Emanuel。新总统也与很多年轻的犹太裔民主党人走得很近,这些人支持“J街道”组织的观点,认为以色列要想生存就需要“挚爱”,并将它结合进与巴勒斯坦达成公平的协议中去。许多有见识的“悲观主义者”认为两个国家的解决方案已经太迟了。今天的形势很暗淡。但对有新团队、新策略,以及包括美国犹太人在内的不同的亲以色列和亲巴勒斯坦人的支持,奥巴马可能还有最后的机会。
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发表于 2010-3-18 01:44 | 显示全部楼层
嗯,翻得很不错!辛苦了,赞一下~~
有个别地方谈谈我的看法,仅供参考。

第四段,Yet hope persists,yet这里表示转折。倒数第二句sympathetic,同情。

第五段,true翻译成“显然;无疑”似乎更好一些。

第八段,three early tests中的early这里是指expected in the near future,不久;很快。

第九段,on the spot,是指in a difficult situation。

第十段,
在没有美国强烈反应和违反国际法的情况下,每一个以色列领导人都继续放任犹太人定居点扩张

这句话前半句略微有点歧义,最好把“违反国际法”放到后半句去。并且,我理解这句话的意思是强调,以色列大肆扩建,但美国从来没有做出强烈反应。这跟“在美国没有强烈反应的情况下”以色列持续扩建有一定的区别。

第十二段,
如果一方的行为故意损害使美国失去正在调停的协议的签订机会,那么美国不会对这种和平进程提供庇护。

这句话不是很通顺,需要重新整理一下。lend its auspices,翻译成“支持”比较好些。of either side ,任何一方。

第十三段,
cannot any longer be certain to veto finger-wagging resolutions at the United Nations would be another

这里cannot any longer be certain to的意思是不再必定/必然会……,而不是“不能再……”。finger-wagging resolutions中,finger-wagging,“摇指头的”,表示“责难;非议”等,这里是说美国可以改变以往针对联合国“谴责”以色列的“决议”一贯予以否决的做法。实际上是在威胁以色列要对美俯首帖耳。

第十四段,two-state solution,最好作为专有名词翻译,加引号(“两个国家的解决方案”,比较简洁的是“两国制”解决方案)。the nationalist umbrella group to which Hamas does not belong,这句中的belong to 漏译了。umbrella group 中的umbrella并不是“保护伞;庇护”的意思,而是something that encompasses or covers many different elements or groups;having the function of uniting a group of similar things ,也就是指“伞状/型组织;伞子团体”,由许多团体联合/统合而成的组织。不过直译通常比较费解,意译就可以了,比如“综合/联合”之类的,或者不译。
appointment,任命;这里应该不是指“提名”。
growing这里是指“越来越多的”。

第十五段,rejects Israel’s existence 中reject翻译成“否认/拒绝承认”比较好。

for its supposed treachery in accepting the Jewish state and the principle of Palestine’s partition.

treachery 应该是指“背叛”,因为法塔赫accepting...。accept翻译成“承认”比较好。the principle of Palestine’s partition,分割方案,这里是指1988年11月巴勒斯坦全国委员会通过的《独立宣言》明确巴勒斯坦接受1947年11月29日联大通过的第181号决议(分治决议):规定巴勒斯坦在1948年结束英国的委任统治后建立一个犹太国和一个阿拉伯国,耶路撒冷则国际化。

第十六段,Henry Siegman漏译了。
Khaled Meshaal, its secretary-general,有关哈马斯的报道中没有“秘书长”的职务,有报道称马沙尔为哈马斯“政治局主席”。

第十七段,
哈马斯将“作为一个现实”接受以色列

这句话中文意思不通,我以为可以翻译成“哈马斯将承认以色列的‘实际存在’。”
末句不是说停火“这个过程可能需要”多长多长,而是说停火时间可以持续多长。

第十九段,
而法塔赫因腐败以及通过和谈赢得一个国家的失败而失去人心

这里,“通过和谈赢得一个国家的失败”过分拘泥于字面了:未能通过和谈/谈判建立国家。

第廿一段,though necessarily, at this stage, in private这里是“尽管眼下会谈必然是私下/秘密进行的”的意思。
“紧密工作”:“合作”?

It is increasingly clear that no deal in that case will stick if only one half of the Palestinian movement is involved.

one half of the Palestinian movement ,这里的意思是说巴勒斯坦运动的一半力量。无疑地,只有哈马斯和法塔赫团结起来,才能代表整个巴勒斯坦人民。所以和平进程必须要这两方都参与进来。

第廿二段,a group of senior bipartisan foreign-policy veterans handed a compelling letter中,bipartisan漏译了;compelling 这里是Urgently requiring attention; arousing strong interest之意,“急迫;令人注目德;引起兴趣的”。

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, who headed the National Security Council in Mr Carter’s and George Bush senior’s White House;

这里布热津斯基、斯考克罗夫特分别是卡特和老布什两位总统的国家安全事务助理。
Sam Nunn:萨姆·纳恩。
Paul Volcker:保罗·沃尔克。
more recently entrusted by the younger President Bush with reviving the Palestinian economy. 这里more recently可以翻译成“早前”,沃尔芬森2005年5月被中东问题有关四方(Quartet)任命为中东问题四方特使,其任务之一就是振兴(revive)巴勒斯坦经济。1年后因中东和平路线图陷入僵局而离职。现任特使就是英国前首相布莱尔。

第廿七段,in its determination to defend itself ,下定决心/坚决保护自己。

第廿八段,It is bluntly opposed to AIPAC and the array of groups that have backed Israel whatever the circumstances这里,be opposed to 是指“反对……”,不是“被……反对”。whatever the circumstances是限定那些groups的,是指他们不分青红皂白、盲目支持以色列。
on a roll 漏译了:好运连连;连连得胜。

第卅段,Rahm Emanuel,拉姆·伊曼纽尔,奥巴马的幕僚长(chief of staff)——白宫办公厅主任。
by squeezing it into giving the Palestinians a fair deal.这里的it应该是指以色列,意思是这些亲以团体出于对以色列的“挚爱”,为了她的生存着想,应该逼迫她与巴勒斯坦人达成公平协议。
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发表于 2010-3-18 01:45 | 显示全部楼层
楼上的板砖,可圈可点,学习了,以后还请多指教。:handshake
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