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[2010.2.11] Tightening economic policy:Withdrawing the drugs 停止用药

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发表于 2010-3-18 07:01 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Tightening economic policy
经济政策紧缩

Withdrawing the drugs
停止用药

Policymakers are wondering when and how to start a delicate task: weaning the world economy off fiscal and monetary stimulus
各国决策者们都在寻找恰当的时机和方式来应对这个棘手的难题:如何撤回财政和货币刺激

Feb 11th 2010 | From The Economist print edition



THE world economy has been injected with the biggest Keynesian cocktail yet seen in peacetime. In the past 18 months governments have pumped cash into their economies to fight financial seizure and recession. Central banks have slashed interest rates (see chart 1); the rich world’s largest ones have supplemented ultra-cheap money with a special drug, quantitative easing (QE). Finance ministries have cut taxes and boosted public spending.

世界经济被注入和平年代以来最大剂量的凯恩斯鸡尾酒。而在过去的18个月里,各国政府为了应对金融危机和经济低迷,大量投入资金给经济输血急救。各国央行大幅度调低利率(见图表1),最大的几个经济强国还采取了“定量宽松”政策。各国的财长们都开始减税,并扩大政府支出。



This infusion has had a dramatic effect. It prevented the biggest financial bust since the 1930s from triggering an economic catastrophe. Banks were stabilised, asset prices rebounded and the global recession, though the deepest since the second world war, was no second Depression. The pace of recovery varies, but every big economy has stopped shrinking.

这样的紧急输血效果还算明显。各国的刺激政策和资金注入成功地防止了这场自上世纪30年代以来最严重的金融危机进一步恶化引发经济灾难。各国银行稳住了,资产价格有所回升,而这场二战以来影响最深远的全球经济衰退也没有演变为第二次经济大萧条。各国经济复苏的脚步快慢不一,但是各经济大国都止住了经济萎缩。

Although by most measures the world economy is out of intensive care, it is hardly in good health. Big emerging economies are growing briskly, but in many rich ones, notably in Europe, the recovery is fragile. Growth is still heavily dependent on government stimulants, even as their side- effects are becoming clear. In China, a huge, state-directed lending binge has propped up demand but is also fuelling asset bubbles, especially in property. As big, rich economies’ budget deficits have risen more than fourfold, to an average of 9% of GDP (see chart 2), public debt has started to shoot up. In the euro zone, in particular, investors are getting nervous. The recent leap in Greek bond yields and the pressure on Portugal and Spain suggests that some governments may soon run out of fiscal room.

尽管世界经济已经不用再重症监护了,但是还远远没有完全康复。新兴发展中大国的经济复苏势头强劲,而在许多发达经济强国,尤其在欧洲,复苏的情况却不容乐观。经济增长很大程度上还依靠政府的刺激方案,而这时,刺激方案的弊端也在逐渐凸显。在中国,政府出台的大量借贷政策虽然刺激了需求,但同时也在催生更多资产泡沫,尤其是房地产产业。各经济强国的预算赤字翻了两番多,平均达到GDP的9%(见图表2),各国公共债务也不断攀高。尤其是在欧元区,投资者们坐立不安。近期希腊国债收益率飙升,西班牙和葡萄牙也面临重重压力,这表明,一些国家快要被逼到财政死角了。



All this leaves policymakers with an unenviable task: deciding when and how to withdraw the drugs. An “exit strategy”, in official jargon, requires answers to three questions. First, timing: when should fiscal and monetary tightening begin? Second, tactics: is it more important to start by cutting budget deficits or by raising interest rates? Third, technique: how will central banks, with their balance-sheets bloated by the unusual policies of the past year and a half, go about tightening monetary conditions? There are no easy answers.

这给各国决策者们抛出了一个异常艰巨的任务:他们必须选择一个适当的时机和方式撤回刺激方案。用官方术语来说,这样的一个“退市计划”需要回答三个问题。首先,恰当的时机:何时才是开始撤回财政和货币刺激的最佳时机?第二,恰当的策略:从削减预算赤字开始还是从上调利率开始呢?第三,恰当的手段:各国央行在过去的一年半中采取了一系列非常规政策,导致资产负债表膨胀,而现在将会如何紧缩货币政策呢?要回答这三个问题,绝非易事。

You shouldn’t start from here
不该从这里下刀

Begin with the timing. Policymakers have to avoid doing too much too soon, which could kill a frail recovery, and doing too little too late, which could lead to budgetary crises and inflation—or to a bond-market rout as investors anticipate trouble. The course of action is clear when the recovery is robust, as it is in big emerging markets and rich countries far from the centre of the financial crisis. Their economies have little spare capacity and no reason to keep monetary or fiscal policy at emergency settings. It is no surprise that they have been the first to tighten.

首先,从时机讲起。各国决策者们不得不提高警惕,一旦撤药过度过犹不及,恐怕连当下微弱的复苏也会停滞。而另一方面,如若撤药过慢,不但会导致预算危机和通胀,而且在投资者意识到问题所在时还会引发债券市场崩盘。在一些经济复苏势头强劲的国家,如新兴发展中国家和一些远离金融风暴中心的经济强国,行动计划清晰明了。这些国家并无过多的闲置生产能力,也不必长期采取应急性的货币和财政政策。所以,这些国家已经率先开始了紧缩政策。

Australia, Israel and Norway increased interest rates late in 2009. A month ago China raised banks’ reserve requirements and began to clamp down on lending. India’s central bank followed suit, raising reserve requirements on January 29th. Fiscal policy is also being tightened. Brazil (see article), India and Mexico all plan to cut their underlying deficits this year.

澳大利亚、以色列和挪威在2009年年底调高了利率。一个月之前,中国上调了存款准备金率,并开始收紧借贷政策。印度央行紧随其后,在今年的1月29日上调了存款准备金率。巴西、印度和墨西哥三国也开始采取紧缩财政的政策,并计划在今年开始削减财政赤字。

The task is harder in big, rich economies, where growth is more fragile. Central banks have made a start, mainly by unwinding the emergency liquidity facilities with which they fought financial panic. Five of the Federal Reserve’s seven crisis-lending windows were closed on February 1st. The European Central Bank (ECB) has stopped lending banks unlimited 12-month funds. The currency swap lines that central banks set up among themselves have also been shut down. QE—creating money and using it to buy bonds—is coming to an end, or at least pausing. On February 4th the Bank of England said it was halting its purchases of gilts, though Mervyn King, the governor, said it was “far too soon to conclude that no more would be needed.” The Fed is buying fewer mortgage-backed securities and plans a full stop by April. Ben Bernanke, its chairman, laid out its tools in congressional testimony on February 10th, but made it clear that the Fed was not about to tighten policy.

而在经济增长很不稳定的经济大国里,要完成这样的任务更为艰巨。这些经济大国的央行已经开了一个头,主要撤回了之前用来抗击金融风暴的紧急流动性措施。今年2月1日,美联储的七个危机借贷窗口关闭了五个。欧洲央行向相关银行提供的12个月期的贷款无限额贷款也已经停止。各国央行之间的货币互换协议也已经终止。之前各国用来增加货币供应和购买国债的“定量宽松”政策几乎快要走到尽头,或至少也要暂时喊停。尽管行长默文·金认为“现在就开始退市计划还为时过早”,但是英格兰银行仍然在2月4日表示将停止购买国债。美联储将逐渐减少住房抵押贷款债券的购买规模,并计划在今年4月完全停止。原计划2月10日召开的国会听证会因天气原因取消,美联储主席伯南克当天公布了有关美联储撤回应急性经济刺激措施计划的证词,但也清楚地表明美联储离紧缩货币政策还有一段时间。

Fiscal policy is more disparate. Some countries are loosening further. In America, Barack Obama’s recent budget proposed tax cuts and spending worth an extra 1.8% of GDP in the next two years. Japan has also added to its deficit spending plans. Many more countries, such as Germany, will see budget deficits rise as parts of earlier stimulus packages kick in.

在财政政策方面,各国的行动更是参差不齐。一些国家在进一步地宽松财政:美国总统奥巴马在近期预算中提出占GDP1.8%的政策性减税和政府支出计划;日本也增加了赤字支出计划;而在德国等其他国家,随着刺激方案的继续推进,财政赤字将会不断攀高。

Elsewhere tighter budgets are at hand, even in weak economies. Bond-market troubles are forcing Greece’s government to freeze public-sector wages and raise taxes, and causing Portugal’s and Spain’s to accelerate budget cuts. After its election, due by June 3rd, Britain seems due for similar treatment, especially if the Conservatives take over from Labour.

反观其他国家,即使在经济并不雄厚的国家,财政预算则相对紧缩。在希腊,债券市场问题重重,政府不得不缩减公共事业单位薪资并提高税收。这也使得葡萄牙和西班牙进一步加快削减预算。等今年6月3日的大选一过,尤其是一旦保守党上台,英国很快也会采取类似的措施。

The list of rich countries forced into austerity by the markets is still short—and confined to weaker members of the euro zone, not least because they cannot devalue their currencies. But it could lengthen if growth remains anaemic and deficits stay high. Modern, global capital markets have never seen a rise in public debt so fast or so skewed towards the rich world. The average ratio of public debt to GDP in big, rich economies has jumped from below 80% to nearly 100% in two years. The IMF reckons it will near 120% by 2014. Meanwhile, big emerging economies’ ratios are likely to decline. The perceived relative riskiness of rich countries’ debt could well rise—and so could their relative bond yields.

被迫紧缩的富裕国家不多,大多是欧元区货币相对弱势的边缘国家——因为在单一货币体系中,这些国家都失去了货币政策的独立性,无法利用本币贬值应对债务危机。如果经济增长持续不见起色,各国赤字居高不下,将会有越来越多的国家被迫紧缩财政。富裕国家在很短的时间内债台高筑,这在现代全球资本市场中几乎是史无前例的。在短短两年里,这些经济强国的负债率从80%一下飙升到将近100%。IMF预计到2014年这一比重将会上涨到近120%。而与此同时,新兴经济大的负债率则会下降。富裕国家债务的相对风险增加的同时,相对证券收益也会增多。

Domestic politics may also squeeze budgets. Tighter policy is usually unpopular, but that can change. In America, opinion has shifted sharply in the past year as more people doubt the efficacy of government spending and fret about the holes in the public purse. Despite Mr Obama’s looser budget, about 60% of Americans think deficit reduction should be the government’s main economic priority.

国内政策也会导致预算缩紧。虽然紧缩政策现在还不太受欢迎,但是这种状况总会变的。过去一年中,美国舆论有了很大的转变,越来越多的人们不但怀疑政府支出是否起作用,还愈发担忧那些补不完的财政漏洞。尽管奥巴马总统放宽了预算,但是六成的美国民众仍然认为美国政府的首要经济工作应该是降低财政赤字。

Given all this, two schools of thought are emerging on timing. The dominant one, which includes the IMF and the G7 finance ministers (who met on February 5th and 6th), thinks that when the risks are weighed up, it is too soon to tighten. The IMF, which believes that a “premature and incoherent” exit from stimulus is a serious danger for the world economy, wants no fiscal or monetary tightening in big, rich economies until 2011. As Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the fund’s boss, puts it: if countries start cutting budgets a year late, they will have an unnecessarily large debt burden. If they tighten too early, and the world economy relapses, the mess will be far bigger, not least because policymakers will be all but out of ammunition.

尽管如此,对于退市计划仍然存在了两种不同看法。一种是主流观点,包括IMF和七国集体财长(2月5日和6日在加拿大举行会议)所支持的看法,认为危机还在继续,紧缩政策为时过早。IMF认为,“不成熟和不一致”的退市计划将会对世界经济造成危害,并建议经济强国的财政和货币紧缩政策可以推迟到2011年之后执行。IMF主席斯特劳斯·卡恩表示,如果削减预算过晚,那么各国政府将会背负不必要的巨大债务负担。但如果退市过早,世界经济将会再次面临双谷衰退。到那时,情况会更加糟糕,而各国的决策者也会更加束手无策。

The smaller, but growing, school argues not only that Keynesian deficit spending has reached its limits but also that a serious effort at cutting deficits would boost confidence and thus counter the drag on demand from lower government spending. This view has adherents at the ECB, which wants faster fiscal retrenchment by members of the euro area. Britain’s Conservatives also belong in this camp. Partly this is political: a new government can blame the fiscal pain on its predecessor’s failings. But it is also based on the belief that Britain would be better off if its deficit were cut sooner than Labour intends.

另一种较为小众但也在不断扩大的观点则认为,凯恩斯主义的赤字政策已经走到尽头,而只有努力降低赤字能够重新提升信心,从而稳住由于政府支出减少而降低的需求量。在欧洲央行里不乏这一观点的支持者,他们都希望欧元区各国能够更快地减少财政支出。英国保守党也支持这一观点。虽然从某方面讲有一定政治因素:新政府可以将其面临的财政困境归咎于上届政府失败的财政政策,但另外一个原因是,保守党相信如果能够比工党的计划更提早降低赤字,那么英国的日子会更好过一些。

The logic behind this is derived from a theory called Ricardian equivalence, which holds that government spending cannot boost demand, since consumers cut their own expenditure in anticipation of higher taxes ahead. Though there is little to indicate that households behave in this way in general, there is evidence that when governments are heavily in debt fiscal stimulus becomes less effective, and investors’ and consumers’ confidence can deteriorate suddenly. And when debt-laden governments sort out their budgets, investors accept lower bond yields. Several studies show that the expansionary effect of lower interest rates has often outweighed the contractionary effect of lower government spending.

这背后的逻辑来自于李嘉图等价定理,该定理认为政府支出并不能拉动需求,因为消费者们能够预料到税收将提高,所以会削减开支。尽管没有证据表明每家每户都会这样做,但是有据可依的是当政府财政债务沉重时,刺激方案的效用通常会大打折扣,投资者和消费者的信心也会迅速瓦解。而当政府着手降低赤字时,即使债券收益率较低,投资者们也愿意进行投资。几项研究表明,低利率的扩张性效应通常比减少政府支出的紧缩性效应更为突出。

This might not work today. At 4%, British bond yields are already low by past standards. They have some room to fall, but not a lot. Nor, with credit tight and consumers keen to rebuild their balance-sheets, is it likely that greater confidence will boost private spending much. At best there is a precautionary case: without fiscal tightening, the Tories fear, bond yields are bound to rise, especially when the Bank of England stops buying gilts.

但是,这种观点在今天也许不凑效了。英国现在4%的债券收益率用以前的标准衡量已经算很低了,但就是这样的低收益率,就算能继续下降,也不可能大跌。在当前信用吃紧,消费者们更倾向于重建资产负债表的情况下,即使人们的信心有所回升,也不太可能会大幅度增加私人支出。财政紧缩政策充其量是个预防措施,保守党们会担心,如不紧缩财政,尤其加上英格兰银行停止购买国债,债券收益率将会持续走高。

These competing theories don’t tell policymakers exactly when they should start tightening. But they do suggest where it is most urgent—and therefore who should start first. Small, open economies (such as Greece’s or Ireland’s) gain relatively little from looser fiscal policy, because a lot of the effect spills abroad. They also suffer heavily when investors lose confidence. Countries with heavy debt burdens (like Italy), whose tax base has collapsed (Ireland and Spain), which had a big budget deficit to start with (Britain) or whose long-term growth prospects have been hit hardest (Spain) should fear a sudden loss of investors’ confidence more than those with smaller deficits (Germany), better demographic prospects (America) or a reserve currency (America again). Japan, with the highest debt burden of all, weak growth and terrible demographics, ought to have lost investors’ confidence long ago, but thanks to a pliant domestic saver base, falls somewhere in between.

这些各持其说的观点也并没有明确地为决策者们指出采取紧缩政策的具体时机。但是,这些观点倒是指出了哪些国家最急需紧缩政策——因此谁便应该带头开始紧缩。宽松的财政政策对于小型开放式经济(如希腊和爱尔兰)来说并无多大益处,因为很大程度上定量宽松政策的效果会外流,一旦投资者对其失去信心,将会造成非常严重的打击。有的国家债务缠身(如意大利),有的税基崩溃(如爱尔兰和西班牙),有的预算赤字异常严重(如英国),还有的未来经济增长前景黯淡(如西班牙)。比起赤字较少(如德国)、人口结构更好(如美国)以及储备货币发行国(又如美国)来说,前面的问题国家应该更担心失去投资者信心。而债务负担最重、增长最不稳定、人口结构最糟糕的日本在很久以前就让投资者对其完全失去信心了。但幸亏调动了国内储蓄基础,这才让日本的总体情况不至于最糟糕。

These differences suggest that the right time to start tightening fiscal policy will vary, even among countries with similarly weak recoveries. Those with more fiscal room (especially Germany, but also America) should wait longer than those (such as Britain) with less.

国家之间的差异表明采取紧缩政策的时机因国而异。即使同是经济复苏缓慢的国家,最佳的时机也不尽相同。留有财政支出空间的国家(如德国和美国)紧缩的时间应该比财政吃紧的国家(如英国)相对延后一些。

Take a deep breath
深呼吸

Eventually, however, all big, rich economies will have to cut their deficits and keep doing so for several years. How tight belts will have to be depends on the debt ratio that countries aim for, the size of their deficits, how fast they grow and the interest rates they face (see article). Countries that decide to live with higher debt burdens will, in the long run, grow more slowly than the prudent, as government debt crowds out private investment.

无论如何,最后所有富裕大国都不得不在未来某个时刻开始降低赤字,而且这一过程会持续几年。而紧缩的这根弦要拉多紧则取决于各国的负债率目标、赤字规模以及经济增长速度和利率情况。从长远来看,选择承受较高债务的国家经济增长速度会比债务较少的国家慢,因为政府负债会挤掉私人投资。

Roughly speaking, simply stabilising the debt ratios of big, rich economies at the levels forecast for 2014 would require an improvement, on average, of about 4% of GDP in primary budget balances (revenue minus spending, excluding interest payments). To bring ratios of debt to GDP back to 60%, a number widely seen as prudent prior to the crisis, would take twice as much effort. The average hides huge variations. Britain’s fiscal adjustment, as a share of GDP, would need to be more than three times as big as Germany’s.

粗略看来,光是将富裕大国的负债率稳定在2014年的预计水平上就需要将基本预算平衡(岁入减去除支付利息以外的支出)平均提高GDP的4%。要将负债率重新降低到60%(危机之前广泛接受的指标),则需要双倍的努力。而这仅仅是个平均指标,对于不同国家还存在许多不确定因素。例如在英国,财政调整占GDP的比重将近德国的三倍多。

This has been done before. In recent decades ten rich countries, from Canada to Ireland, managed to improve their budget balances by more than 10% of GDP. But they did not all do so at once. Nor, most importantly for today’s exit strategists, did they do so when short-term interest rates were already close to zero.

这样的情况并不是第一次出现。最近几十年,从加拿大到爱尔兰等十大富裕国家,都在努力将其基本预算平衡提高超过GDP的10%。但是这十大富国并没有同时这样做。在当前短期利率接近零的情况下,十大富国中没有一个国家进行调整,这对于当前的退市计划非常重要。

That leads to the second question, of the right blend of fiscal and monetary tightening. Most fiscal adjustments since the second world war have led to lower interest rates. Today central bankers have little room to offset budgetary austerity with cheaper money. In theory they could expand QE, but in practice none is keen. More likely, stricter fiscal policy will mean less monetary tightening than there would be otherwise. If the recovery is weak to begin with, and then slowed by budget cuts, short-term interest rates in the rich world could be unusually low for several years.

这引出了第二个问题:要如何恰当地将财政和货币政策融合在一起?二战以后大部分国家的财政调整都导致了低利率。如今,央行也不能再通过货币贬值来弥补预算吃紧。理论上他们可以采取定量宽松政策,但是从实际来看,没人想要这么做。相反,更紧缩的财政政策将意味着货币政策不必那么紧缩。如果复苏一开始就不稳定,并随着削减预算减慢,这样一来,富裕国家在未来好几年的短期利率都会异常低。



At first sight, this is a good idea. The alternative—higher interest rates and big budget deficits—would mean larger, costlier debts. Loose money and tighter budgets also tend to lead to a weaker exchange rate, so this mix of policies would also speed up the rebalancing of the global economy, by weakening rich countries’ currencies relative to those of emerging markets. And because most rich economies have bags of spare capacity, and tighter budgets would restrict demand, inflation would be unlikely to accelerate.

乍一看,这是个好主意。因为如果选择提高利率扩大预算赤字,政府将会面临更重的债务负担。宽松的货币政策和紧缩的预算政策同样可以推动汇率走低。这套组合政策同样可以通过使富裕国家货币相对于新兴市场货币贬值来加快全球经济的重新平衡。由于大部分富裕国家闲置生产能力较多,紧缩的预算政策将会限制需求,通胀不太可能加速。

This strategy has drawbacks nonetheless. Even if consumer prices are stable, a long period of ultra-low interest rates in rich economies is likely to fuel asset bubbles and other financial distortions—much as it did after 2003. This time central bankers might try to use regulations to pop incipient bubbles. For example, they might limit the ratios of mortgage loans to property values. Several Asian central banks do so already. Some in the rich world are quietly exploring the idea.

尽管如此,这一策略仍然有不足之处。即使在消费者价格稳定的富裕国家里,但长时间的超低利率很可能会像2003年那样增加资产泡沫或导致其他金融问题。这一次,央行也许会利用规章制度来挤掉刚出现的泡沫。例如,央行可能会限制抵押贷款额/物业价值的比率。亚洲几个国家的央行已经这样做了。而富裕国家的央行也在悄然研究这一政策。

Years of cheap money in the rich world would pose problems for policymakers in emerging economies, as capital flooded in seeking higher yields. Some already have home-made difficulties. China’s refusal to allow the yuan to appreciate is already one of the biggest causes of distortion in the world economy. A stronger yuan would ease China’s inflation malaise and help in forming a global exit strategy.

好几年来,富裕国家的货币都很廉价,而资本总是流向收益较高的市场,这让新兴国家的决策者们非常头疼。有的国家已经存在一些国内问题。中国拒绝让人民币升值也成为世界经济不平衡的一大因素。人民币升值会减轻中国的通胀压力,并且能帮助其他国家更好地制定全球性的退市计划。

However, blameless emerging economies, especially small, open ones, would also find domestic monetary stability hard to maintain. Left alone, their currencies could easily overshoot. Allowing a gradual appreciation often simply invites more foreign capital, as investors expect the currency to rise. Building up reserves makes control of inflation harder. Capital controls to stem the inflow look likely.

然而,无辜的新兴国家,尤其是那些小型开放式经济,将难以维持国内货币局势稳定。更不用说,这些新兴国家的货币很容易升值过快。保持本国货币逐步升值通常都会吸引更多外汇,因为很多投资者都会买入该国货币以期升值套利。国内外汇的增多,让控制通胀的工作更为艰难。因此,中国很可能采取资本管制的手段来减少外汇流入。

Those risks are probably worth taking, given the likely weakness of the rich world’s recovery and the scale of its fiscal task. Nonetheless, a carefully calibrated budgetary tightening, which allows central banks to move a notch or two from rock bottom, may be no bad thing. As Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley puts it, the monetary dials should shift from the “emergency” setting to “simply lousy”. Many central bankers privately agree.

这样的风险也许值得承担,因为富裕国家的复苏十分微弱,而财政负担又很重。尽管如此,精打细算地紧缩预算并不是件坏事,这能够给跌落谷底央行创造一些向上爬的希望。正如摩根斯坦利的斯蒂芬·洛奇说道,货币政策状况应该从“危机性”转向“比较糟糕”。许多央行都暗自赞同这一说法。

Central bankers’ new tools
央行支新招

The possibility that modest tightening makes sense even in a weak recovery raises the third, technical question, especially for central banks, such as the Fed and the Bank of England, that have made most use of unconventional measures. When they do decide to tighten monetary conditions, how do they do it?

即使在复苏微弱的国家,相对温和的紧缩政策也可能凑效。这也尤其为那些之前大量采取非常规手段的央行,诸如美联储和英格兰银行,抛出了第三个问题,即如何寻求恰当的紧缩手段?当这些国家真的决定了要开始紧缩政策,他们具体会怎样做呢?

Thanks to QE, central banks now have two policy levers: short-term policy rates, as before, and the size of their balance-sheets. Some people worry that by expanding their balance-sheets central banks have been playing with inflationary fire (see chart 3). The counterpart to their assets is banks’ excess reserve holdings with central banks. If banks decided to lend that money, credit could explode.

幸亏采取了定量宽松的政策,央行现在手头有两支杠杆:一个是一贯采用的短期政策利率,另一个是资产负债表规模。有人担心,央行采用扩大资产负债表规模的手段无疑是在玩“通胀”之火(见图表3)。而与央行资产相对应的是其他银行在央行的超额存款准备金。如果银行一旦决定要用这笔钱来放贷,那么信贷可能暴增。



This is too simplistic, not least because central bankers have been busy creating means of holding on to the reserves if need be. All big central banks now pay interest on reserves. Several have new ways of draining reserves. Mr Bernanke said this week that the Fed, which has the widest range of novel measures, plans to offer banks term deposits, enabling it to lock up reserves for several months.

这也太过简单了,尤其是各国央行一直都再创造必要时持有存款准备金的新政策。几乎所有大国的央行现在都为存款准备金支付利息。一些央行则采用新方式来减少存款准备金。美联储主席伯南克这周表示,除了近期一连串新动作,美联储计划向各银行出售定期存款,以此继续持有存款准备金,帮助收紧货币政策。

In principle, these devices mean that the size of a central bank’s balance-sheet should not affect its ability to influence monetary conditions. They even broaden its options. Central banks could raise short-term interest rates or they could steepen the yield curve by selling longer-dated assets from their balance-sheets.

从原则上讲,这些手段意味着央行的资产负债表规模不应该有碍于其对货币情况施加影响的能力。相反,这一连串新方式还为央行提供了更多选择。央行可以选择上调短期利率,或者抛售长期资产以实现债券收益率曲线陡峭化。

In practice, the tools are untested. Central bankers will find it harder to know how they are affecting monetary conditions or to be clear about what they are doing. Mr Bernanke suggested, for instance, that the Fed could temporarily target the interest rate it paid on excess reserves, rather than the federal funds rate. If financial markets find central bankers’ actions more difficult to understand and anticipate, the way monetary policy is transmitted to the broader economy could be distorted.

而在现实操作中,这些新工具都还未经过检验。央行会发现,要弄明白这些新工具是如何影响货币情况或是到底起了什么作用并非易事。譬如,伯南克建议美联储应该暂时从超额存款准备金的支付利率下手,而不是联邦基金利率。如果金融市场无法理解和预测央行的行动,那么货币政策传递到整体经济的路径就可能被扭曲。

There are political pitfalls too. In America, for instance, paying banks higher interest on excess reserves will sound to many like handing money to villains. Selling mortgage-backed securities would draw fire from politicians worried about higher mortgage rates. At a time when the Fed is held in low public regard, the stakes are high. A badly handled tightening, even if modest, could seriously threaten the central bank’s independence.

除此以外,政治陷进也是个麻烦。譬如,在美国,给银行的超额存款储备金支付更高的利息听起来就像是助纣为虐。而抛售住房抵押贷款债券会招来担心抵押贷款利率升高的政客的强烈攻击。当美联储得不到公众支持时,风险很高。如若手段采取不当,即使是温和的紧缩政策也会严重威胁到央行的独立性。

Adding together the uncertainty about the recovery’s strength, the scale of the coming fiscal adjustment and the technical and political difficulties facing central banks leads to three conclusions. First, policymakers do not have to worry only about when to start tightening: the mixture of fiscal and monetary policies must be coherent, too.

再加上复苏的不稳定性,接下来的财政调整规模以及央行所面临的技术上和政治上的困难导致了三个结果。第一,决策者们不但要担心紧缩的时机问题,还要担心如何让财政和货币政策做到相互协调。

Second, that suggests central banks and finance ministries must co-ordinate their policies more closely than in recent years. Economists have long thought of monetary policy as the main means of managing the cycle; central banks have long feared that overt co-operation with governments would risk their politicisation. The opposite may now be true.

第二,央行和财长们必须在政策上比往年更加一致。经济学家一贯都认为货币政策才是经济周期管理中的主要手段,而央行却一直都很担忧与政府公开合作会威胁到其独立性。现在却可能导致相反的结果。

Third, the term “exit strategy” may be a misnomer. Weaning the world economy off fiscal and monetary stimulants will take many years. And like a former addict, the patient may never be quite the same again.

第三,“退市计划”这一说法或用词不当。将财政和货币刺激抽离世界经济要花上好几年的时间。如果像上次那样用药过度,世界经济也许真的不能完全康复了。
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发表于 2010-3-18 07:02 | 显示全部楼层
小女子能力有限,翻的吐血~
肯定有很多错误,都不好意思到处标红了,希望大家批评。。。
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发表于 2010-3-18 07:02 | 显示全部楼层
THE world economy has been injected with the biggest Keynesian cocktail yet seen in peacetime.
世界经济被注入和平年代以来最大剂量的凯恩斯鸡尾酒。

As big, rich economies’ budget deficits have risen more than fourfold, to an average of 9% of GDP (see chart 2), public debt has started to shoot up.
各经济强国的预算赤字翻了两番多,平均达到GDP的9%(见图表2),各国公共债务也不断创下新高。
---->公共债务开始迅速增加

The recent leap in Greek bond yields and the pressure on Portugal and Spain suggests that some governments may soon run out of fiscal room.
近期希腊国债收益率飙升,西班牙和葡萄牙也面临重重压力,这表明,一些国家快要被逼到死角了。
至少应该把什么东西逼到死角说出来,原文很明确,是财政状况快葛屁了。

First, timing: when should fiscal and monetary tightening begin?
首先,恰当的时机:何时才是撤回财政和货币刺激的最佳时机?
--->开始撤回                 

Third, technique: how will central banks, with their balance-sheets bloated by the unusual policies of the past year and a half, go about tightening monetary conditions?
第三,恰当的手段:各国央行在过去的一年半中采取了一系列非常规政策,而现在将会如何紧缩货币政策呢?
非常规政策造成一个巨大的后果,央行资产负债表在膨胀。这是一个关键之处。

Begin with the timing. Policymakers have to avoid doing too much too soon, which could kill a frail recovery, and doing too little too late, which could lead to budgetary crises and inflation—or to a bond-market rout as investors anticipate trouble.
首先,从时机讲起。各国决策者们不得不提高警惕,一旦用药过度过犹不及,恐怕连当下微弱的复苏也会停滞。而另一方面,如若用药不足,不但会导致预算危机和通胀,而且在投资者意识到问题所在时还会引发证券市场崩盘。
--->撤药,退出政策如何如何。债券市场。

新兴发展中国家和一些远离金融风暴中心的经济强国,在这些国家的经济复苏势头强劲,因此行动计划也清晰明了。
The course of action is clear when the recovery is robust,(这里是主干) as(就像) it is in big emerging markets and rich countries far from the centre of the financial crisis. (as后面是举例)

It is no surprise that they have been the first to tighten.
所以,理所当然应该是由这些国家首先进行紧缩政策。
--->完成时,紧缩政策已经实施了。

印度央行紧随其后,在今年的1月29日上调了存款准备金率,紧接着又紧缩财政政策。巴西、印度和墨西哥三国都计划在今年开始削减财政赤字。
---->逗号是句号。财政紧缩的是巴西、印度和墨西哥。

The European Central Bank (ECB) has stopped lending banks unlimited 12-month funds.
欧洲央行在过去一年向相关银行提供的无限额贷款也已经停止了。
--->12-month是贷款期限,12个月期的贷款

Ben Bernanke, its chairman, laid out its tools in congressional testimony on February 10th, but made it clear that the Fed was not about to tighten policy.
原计划2月10日召开的国会听证会因天气原因取消(这句话不知道从哪里来的),美联储主席伯南克(在听证会上lay out)随后公布了有关美联储撤回应急性经济刺激措施计划的证词,但也清楚地表明美联储离紧缩货币政策还有一段时间。

In America, Barack Obama’s recent budget proposed tax cuts and spending worth an extra 1.8% of GDP in the next two years.
美国总统奥巴马在近期预算中提出政策性减税以及占GDP1.8%的政府支出计划
--->小黑人提出的减税和支出增加占GDP的1.8%

Japan has also added to its deficit spending plans.
早已赤字的日本政府还在扩大支出规模
--->日本增加赤字支出计划。

The list of rich countries forced into austerity by the markets is still short
少数被迫紧缩的富裕国家多为欧元区货币相对弱势的边缘国家
--->被迫紧缩的富裕国家很少

The average ratio of public debt to GDP in big, rich economies has jumped from below 80% to nearly 100% in two years.
在短短两年里,这些经济强国的负债率从80%一下飙升到将近100%。
--->发达国家平均公共债务占GDP比

Partly this is political: a new government can blame the fiscal pain on its predecessor’s failings.
虽然从某方面讲有一定政治因素:有望上任的新政府可以借上届政府失败的财政政策来大做文章,
--->新政府可以把fiscal pain归罪于its predecessor’s failings

But it is also based on the belief that Britain would be better off if its deficit were cut sooner than Labour intends.
但更主要(文中没说哪个原因更主要)的原因是,\/保守党相信如果能够比工党的计划更提早降低赤字,那么英国的日子会更好过一些。   

there is evidence that when governments are heavily in debt fiscal stimulus becomes less effective,
但是有据可依的是当政府财政赤字严重时
--->债务沉重时,债务水平是个存量,赤字是个流量

低利率的扩张性效应通常比减少政府支出的紧缩性效应更为突出
--->这句话是对的,上句说如果政府着手优化负债情况(减少支出),即使利率下降(国债收益率降低)投资者也能接受。政府支出减少对经济不利,降低利率对经济有利,有利可以压倒不利,净结果就是有利。

They have some room to fall, but not a lot.
但就是这样的低收益率,就算不会大跌,也还有可能会继续下降
--->就算能继续下降,也不可能大跌

Nor, with credit tight and consumers keen to rebuild their balance-sheets, is it likely that greater confidence will boost private spending much.
在当前信用吃紧的情况下,消费者们更倾向于重建资产负债表。即使人们的信心有所回升,也不太可能会大幅度增加私人支出。
---->红字应该插到资产负债表后面,两个东西是并列的,没有因果关系。这句话和上句话标点太混乱了,要跟原文保持一致。

At best there is a precautionary case: without fiscal tightening, the Tories fear, bond yields are bound to rise, especially when the Bank of England stops buying gilts.
充其量也只有保守党们会担心,不执行财政紧缩政策,尤其加上英格兰银行停止购买国债,债券收益率将会持续走高。
---->这句话说,财政紧缩政策充其量就是个预防措施(阻止利率上升),保守党担心,blablabla

Small, open economies (such as Greece’s or Ireland’s) gain relatively little from looser fiscal policy, because a lot of the effect spills abroad.
定量宽松的财政政策对于小型开放式经济(如希腊和爱尔兰)来说并无多大益处,因为很大程度上定量宽松政策的效果会外流,
--->定量宽松是货币政策。这里是宽松的财政政策。

or a reserve currency (America again)
以及拥有大量外汇储备的国家(又如美国)
--->储备货币发行国

--------------------------分割线--------------------------

太长了,先拍这么多,剩下的以后再拍
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终身成就奖英语达人才华横溢优秀斑竹二级笔译三级笔译

发表于 2010-3-18 07:02 | 显示全部楼层
谢谢你花这么多时间改的这么仔细。
有好多地方我都不太懂,所以翻下来晕乎乎的,谢谢你的解释,基本上我都改了。
有两个地方,
The average ratio of public debt to GDP in big, rich economies has jumped from below 80% to nearly 100% in two years.
在短短两年里,这些经济强国的负债率从80%一下飙升到将近100%。
--->发达国家平均公共债务占GDP比
我在网上查的资料,公共债务占GDP比是负债率,我不知道这个对不对。

Ben Bernanke, its chairman, laid out its tools in congressional testimony on February 10th, but made it clear that the Fed was not about to tighten policy.
原计划2月10日召开的国会听证会因天气原因取消(这句话不知道从哪里来的),美联储主席伯南克(在听证会上lay out)随后公布了有关美联储撤回应急性经济刺激措施计划的证词,但也清楚地表明美联储离紧缩货币政策还有一段时间。

是这样的,新闻中说这个2月10日的听证会是因为天气原因取消了的,伯南克是在当天公布了他本来在听证会上要说的证词。

【专题】伯南克概括美联储退出策略
来源:东航金融 时间:2010-02-12 10:52


  美国当地时间2月10日,美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve,简称美联储)主席伯南克首次开口,全面阐述美联储从金融市场抽回流动性的框架性构想,但没有给出实施“退出”战略的具体时间表。

  伯南克原定10日出席国会众议院金融服务委员会的听证。受美国东海岸暴风雪影响,听证会延期,伯南克改在美联储官方网站发表专门信件来说明退出战略的次序。


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非常感谢版主的修改意见~~~
虚心学习了!!!
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我先把砖拍完,然后你把仍然存在的疑问和值得探讨的地方一并写在二楼,我们再作进一步讨论

Eventually, however, all big, rich economies will have to cut their deficits and keep doing so for several years.
何,最后所有富裕的大国都必须在未来几年不断地降低赤字。
--->必须在未来的某个时刻开始降低赤字,而且这一过程要持续几年

How tight belts will have to be depends on the debt ratio that countries aim for, the size of their deficits, how fast they grow and the interest rates they face (see article).
而紧缩的这根弦要拉多紧则取决于各国的目标,包括负债率和赤字规模,以及经济增长速度和利率情况。
--->这里只有负债率是目标(主观意愿),其他的都是客观事实。

Countries that decide to live with higher debt burdens will, in the long run, grow more slowly than the prudent, as government debt crowds out private investment.
从长远来看,债务负担较重的国家经济增长速度会比债务较少的国家慢,因为政府负债不利于私人投资。
--->决定仍然承受较高债务负担的国家增长会比较慢。crowd out挤出

Roughly speaking, simply stabilising the debt ratios of big, rich economies at the levels forecast for 2014 would require an improvement, on average, of about 4% of GDP in primary budget balances (revenue minus spending, excluding interest payments). To bring ratios of debt to GDP back to 60%, a number widely seen as prudent prior to the crisis, would take twice as much effort. The average hides huge variations. 这是说国与国之间差别很大,前面的数字仅仅是个平均值Britain’s fiscal adjustment, as a share of GDP英国财务调整程度占到GDP的比重是德国的三倍,这是补充说明国与国之间的差别, would need to be more than three times as big as Germany’s.
粗略看来,光是将富裕大国的负债率稳定在2014年的预计水平上就需要将基本预算平衡(税收减去除支付利息以外的支出)平均提高到GDP的4%。要将负债率重新降低到60%(危机之前广泛接受的指标),则需要双倍的努力。而这一平均指标的背后还隐藏着许多不确定因素。在英国,作为GDP中一部分的财政调整将近德国的三倍多。
--->税收应该是岁入,或者财政收入。提高的值,就是括号里的那个数字所提高的程度,相当于GDP的4%。比如说GDP是一万亿,那么(revenue-利息支付之前的支出)就要增加400亿。你把“到”字去掉就可以了。

But they did not all do so at once. Nor, most importantly for today’s exit strategists, did they do so when short-term interest rates were already close to zero.
但是这也不能一蹴而就。最重要的是,在当前短期利率接近零的情况下,退市计划更是要从长计议。
--->两个they有明确的指代,就是那十个富国。最后一句说那是个国家没有一个在利率接近零的情况下调整,这点对现在很重要。

In theory they could expand QE
理论上他们可以扩大量化宽松规模

If the recovery is weak to begin with, and then slowed by budget cuts,
如果复苏一开始就不稳定,随着削减预算复苏会更慢
--->这两个东西都被if所引导,不是因果关系,中间应该用 并且 连接

And because most rich economies have bags of spare capacity, and tighter budgets would restrict demand到这里都是原因, inflation would be unlikely to accelerate.这是结果
由于大部分富裕国家闲置生产能力较多,紧缩的预算政策将会限制需求,并且遏制通胀。
--->通货膨胀不太可能加速

For example, they might limit the ratios of mortgage loans to property values.
例如,央行可能会根据房产价值来限制住房抵押贷款率。
--->限制 抵押贷款额/物业价值 这个比率,比如说物业价值100万,规定的限度时0.8,那么你获得的贷款就不能超过80万。

Some in the rich world are quietly exploring the idea.
而富裕国家的央行很快也会将这一政策付诸实践。
--->一些富国正在悄然对这一政策进行研究。

However, blameless emerging economies, especially small, open ones, would also find domestic monetary stability hard to maintain.
然而,无辜的新兴国家,尤其是那些小型开放式经济,同样也面临着稳定国内货币政策的棘手问题。
--->将难以维持国内货币局势稳定

Those risks are probably worth taking, given the likely weakness of the rich world’s recovery and the scale of its fiscal task.
这样的风险也许值得承担,因为富裕国家的复苏十分微弱,而复苏的标财政目又很高。
--->财政负担很重

The counterpart to their assets is banks’ excess reserve holdings with central banks.
而与此相对应的是其他银行在央行的超额存款准备金。
--->与央行资产相对应的是其他银行在央行的银行超额存款准备金

If banks decided to lend that money, credit could explode.
如果银行一旦决定要用这笔钱来放贷,那么信用将会崩盘。
--->信贷可能暴增

This is too simplistic, not least because central bankers have been busy creating means of holding on to the reserves if need be.
这也太过简单了,尤其是各国央行一直以来都在必要时调整存款准备金政策。
--->央行在创造必要时持有准备金的新方式

Mr Bernanke said this week that the Fed, which has the widest range of novel measures, plans to offer banks term deposits,
美联储还将向各银行提供付息定期存款,
--->美联储计划向各大银行出售定期存款

If financial markets find central bankers’ actions more difficult to understand and anticipate, the way monetary policy is transmitted to the broader economy could be distorted.
如果央行的动作在金融市场里很难被理解和预测,那么货币政策便没有办法对整体经济起作用。
--->如果金融市场无法理解和预测央行的行动,那么货币政策传递到整体经济的路径就可能被扭曲。

Adding together the uncertainty about the recovery’s strength, the scale of the coming fiscal adjustment and the technical and political difficulties facing central banks leads to three conclusions.
再加上复苏的不稳定性,接下来的财政调整规模、紧缩方案以及政治上的困境导致了三个结果。
--->这句话包含了财政和货币两个因素,央行面临技术和政治上的困难。
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发表于 2010-3-18 07:03 | 显示全部楼层
咦,你的回复都没有提示的,我现在才看到~~赶紧学习去~~~
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